The U.S. Rebalance to Asia through the Eyes of Neoclassical Realism:Maintaining the Order in the Asia Pacific amid the Rise of China by SEK, Sophal
i 
 
The U.S. Rebalance to Asia through the  
Eyes of Neoclassical Realism:  
Maintaining the Order in  
the Asia Pacific amid  
the Rise of China 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
SEK Sophal  
 
51114603 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2016 
 
 
 
 
Master‘s Thesis Presented to Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
 
Master of Science in Asia Pacific Studies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
Contents 
 
Certification ........................................................................................................ iv 
Acknowledgement ............................................................................................... v 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................ vii 
Chapter One: Introduction ................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Overview of Sino-U.S. relations and Rebalance ................................ 1 
1.2. Research Objectives .......................................................................... 16 
1.3. Research Questions ........................................................................... 17 
1.4. Research Methodology ..................................................................... 17 
1.5. Research Significance ....................................................................... 19 
Chapter Two: Literature Review ....................................................................... 22 
2.1. Basic Concepts of Realism ............................................................... 22 
2.2. The Debates of the Three Variants of Realism ................................. 24 
2.2.1. Classical Realism: Domestic Politics Drives States‘ Foreign Policy
 25 
2.2.2. Neorealism: International System Drives States‘ Foreign Policy . 30 
2.2.3. Neoclassical Realism: Domestic Politics, International System, 
Gaps in Relative Gains Drive States‘ Foreign Policy .................................... 34 
2.3. The U.S. Rebalance in Realist Thought ............................................ 44 
Chapter Three: the U.S. Interests and Its Relevance to the Rebalance .............. 47 
3.1. Economic Interests ............................................................................ 47 
3.2. Security Interests ............................................................................... 49 
3.3. Diplomatic Interests .......................................................................... 55 
Chapter Four: The U.S. Rebalance in Neoclassical Realism ............................. 59 
4.1. The Rebalance in Classical Realism ................................................. 59 
4.2. The Rebalance in Neorealism ........................................................... 62 
4.3. The Rebalance in Neoclassical Realism ........................................... 65 
4.3.1. The TPP: From Economic Interests to Economic Leadership ...... 66 
4.3.2. The Security Allies and Strategic Partners: Narrowing the Gaps in 
Relative Power ............................................................................................... 71 
4.4. Rebalance in Bureaucratic Politics ................................................... 77 
iii 
 
4.5. Is the U.S. military structure in the Asia-Pacific changed by the U.S. 
Rebalance? ..................................................................................................... 79 
Chapter Five: Conclusion .................................................................................. 83 
5.1. Why Neoclassical Realism? .............................................................. 86 
5.2. Gaps in this Research ........................................................................ 90 
List of References .............................................................................................. 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
Certification 
 
 
I, Sek Sophal, hereby declare that this master thesis is my own work which 
contains ideas and information from published as well as unpublished works of 
different scholars who are recognized through the references listed in the thesis. 
The main arguments and ideas that are not cited are ideas and agreements written 
by author of this thesis. 
  
v 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
 
Writing this thesis is solely my responsibility, but the thesis can never be achieved 
without kind assistance from several people around me.  
 
First, I would like to thank my commander, Brigadier General Nhem Boraden for 
his kindness and supports for my study in Japan. General Nhem Boraden has 
helped me discover who I am, and where I should stay. The jobs at the Ministry of 
National Defense of Cambodia have always been interesting and exciting. We 
have worked as a team, and I have learned a lot of things that cannot be instructed 
at the universities I have attended.  
 
Second, I would like to thank Professor SATO Yoichiro for working tirelessly to 
supervise my thesis. What I have learned from Professor SATO is not only 
academic skills, but also his experience and principles of life, which are the 
fundamental basis for success in the real life. To Professor SATO, I am in debt.  
 
Third, I would like to thank my family and friends. I would like to thank my sister 
who has always supported whenever I need help. I would like to thank my 
Cambodian friends: Taing Koungveng, Eh Sophea, Huot Phanit, Thet Kanika, 
Seang Samart, Houn Chanvy, Peang Srey Nith, Yen Navin who have never said 
no whenever I ask for help. Taing Kounveng, in particular, encouraged me to 
apply for this scholarship, and coordinated my living in Japan even before I 
arrived in Japan. Without them, my living and studying in Japan must be much 
more difficult.   
 
Finally, I would like to thank a Japanese restaurant manager who hired me to 
work. The manager is so kind and helpful. Without the job there, I can never 
support myself to finish my study in Japan. I consider this thesis is the 
achievement of everyone who supports me.   
vi 
 
Abstract 
 
The U.S. rebalance to Asia announced in 2011 by the Obama administration is a 
remarkable turning point of the U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. 
rebalance to Asia, however, is understood differently by different people from 
different background. The liberals, for example, see the rebalance as an ongoing 
engagement of the United States with China. The realists, however, see the policy 
as the U.S. tough diplomacy to contain the rise of China.  
 
Although several previous researches have discussed the rebalance for years since 
its announcement, those researches tend to analyze the shift in the U.S. foreign 
policy based on general theories of international relations. Not many of them have 
so far offered a more precise theoretical explanation of the U.S. rebalance.  
 
The thesis argues that the U.S. rebalance is theoretically explained by realism. 
Given the U.S. selective engagements under the policy of the rebalance, this thesis 
argues that the rebalance is the U.S. strategy to maintain order in the Asia-Pacific 
amid the rise of China. While seeking to maintain the regional supremacy in the 
Asia-Pacific, the United States tries to avoid confronting China in a direct way. 
The thesis argues the United States is seeking to increase its relative power 
against China. Thus, the U.S. rebalance to Asia is best explained by neoclassical 
realism.  
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The U.S. Rebalance to Asia through the Eyes of 
Neoclassical Realism: Maintaining the Order  
in the Asia-Pacific amid the Rise of China  
 
 
We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with 
anybody because we have got most of the world already or the best 
parts of it and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent other 
from taking it away from us. (the statement of delivered by Britain‘s 
First Lord of the Admiralty in June 1934 cited in Scheweller,1998, p. 
24) 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Overview of Sino-U.S. relations and Rebalance  
 
In December 2011, the last convoys of the American troops finally left Iraq 
crossing the border to Kuwait where the preparations for the complete withdrawal 
were ready to bring the men and women in uniforms back home after almost a 
decade of war. The same is happening in Afghanistan. Even though the Afghan 
war is still going on, the fact is that it has already reached a transitional period. 
Leaving Afghanistan is just a matter of time. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
started in 2001 and 2003 respectively seem to be the longest wars in the history of 
the United States except for the Cold War. As the two protracted and unfortunate 
wars were waning, it looks like the interests of the United States are no longer in 
the Middle East as it used to be during the previous U.S. administrations.  
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The shift in the U.S. interests and foreign policy, in fact, came to exist since the 
first day of new U.S. administration when President Obama took office in January 
2009. The recognition of the growing significance of the Asia-Pacific became 
clear when Hillary Clinton, then the U.S. Secretary of State started her first Asia 
trip to Japan, Republic of Korea and China in February 2009 right after being 
confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of State. The importance of the trip was 
highlighted in the sense that neither Europe nor the Middle East is central to the 
new U.S. foreign policy in the new dynamic of international politics in the 21
st
 
century. The key interests of the United States now are in the Asia-Pacific region. 
As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011, p. 56) wrote in her article of 
America’s Pacific Century in 2011 ―the future geopolitics is decided in Asia, not 
in Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States should be right in the center of the 
actions.‖ 
 
The changes of the American foreign policy went beyond its traditional region of 
Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and South Asia. The United States became the 
first non-ASEAN member to appoint an Ambassador to ASEAN, and also became 
the first non-ASEAN member to appoint the first resident Ambassador to ASEAN 
in 2008 and 2011 respectively. President Obama also became the first American 
President to attend ASEAN-led East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2011. As India has 
emerged as one of the fast-growing economies in Asia, the strategic links between 
the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Oceans become even more crucial, given the 
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growing trends of the flow of energy and goods through the Indian Ocean. Thus, 
the United States has upgraded its diplomatic relations with India, and encouraged 
India to ―act East‖ rather than ―look East‖ (White House, 2011). The shift in the 
American foreign policy was even noticeable after President Obama, during his 
visit to Australia in November 2011, announced the policy of the U.S. Pivot to 
Asia, which was renamed the U.S. Rebalance to Asia (White House, 2011).  
 
Historically, the U.S. national interests have long been embedded in the Asia-
Pacific region. This is not to recall the history when the first American ship 
Empress of China sailed from New York to Guangzhou in China in 1784 soon 
after the American Revolution (Shambaugh, 2013b, p. 11). For the security 
interests, the United States fought three major wars in the Asia-Pacific during the 
second half of the 20
th
 century. Moreover, five of the U.S. security allies are in the 
Asia-Pacific. After the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains its 
regional security architecture of the hub-and-spoke system, which has empowered 
its bilateral security alliances and forwards military deployment. The United 
States has permanent bases in both South Korea and Japan with thousands of 
troops. For economic interests, the Asia-Pacific region is home to key trading 
partners of the United States. They are China, Japan, South Korea, India, 
Australia, and countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
 
Even though the Asia-Pacific region is of importance for the U.S. interests, the 
shift in the U.S. foreign policy took place amid the growing economic and 
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security tensions between China and the United States. As a matter of fact, the 
Sino-U.S. relations are categorized as cooperative and competitive. On the 
economic side, the United States and China are locked in economic 
interdependence. America is the most important market and source of investment 
for China, while America enjoys taking advantages of investment in China and 
cheap Chinese products. On the political and security side, however, the relations 
are very competitive. The United States and China has differences over a wide 
range of issues ranging from trade and currency policies, freedom and human 
rights to military modernization and transparency to name a few. These issues are 
subject to controversial discussions among the U.S. and the Chinese 
policymakers.  
 
As the 21
st
 century has begun, the Sino-U.S. relations have become even more 
important but not less competitive. China is rising economically, diplomatically 
and militarily. China‘s economic development is a miracle in the sense that it has 
enjoyed double-digits of uninterrupted growth for 30 years. According to Wayne 
M. Morrison (2015a, p. 1), China is one of the fastest growing countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region with the average annual growth rate about 10 % from 1979 to 
2014. The Chinese diplomacy has been promoted regionally and internationally 
enabling China to become a key player in the international politics. For example, 
China started to engage with regional institutions, such as ASEAN and ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) shortly after the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. 
In 1997, China became a strategic partner of ASEAN before becoming the first 
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non-ASEAN member to accede to ASEAN‘s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) in 2003. 
 
As one of five members of the fast-growing economies of BRICS (an acronym 
representing an association of the fast-growing economies that is made of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa), China has come up with a number of 
initiatives to create international institutions to promote economic cooperation.  In 
2015, for instance, China initiated to establish the Shanghai-based New 
Development Bank (NDB). In early 2016, another bank was created. It is called 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Moreover, China has lately 
initiated the Silk Road project, widely known as a mega infrastructure project to 
link China to Southeast Asia and the Middle East under the name of One Belt, 
One Road. It is noticeable that among these initiatives, China is the biggest 
contributor.  
 
Empowered by the steady economic growth, China has rapidly modernized its 
military power. China‘s defense budget has increased dramatically from year to 
year. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
(2014, p. 173), China‘s military spending increased up to 62 % from 2004 to 
2013. In 2004, China‘s official defense budget was only US$ 63 billion. By 2009, 
the defense spending was increased to US$ 129 billion before reaching US$ 171 
billion in 2013 (SIPRI, 2014; p. 232). With such an increase, China has become 
the second largest country to spend on the military after the United States.  
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However, the rise of China is closely connected to the growing tensions and 
strategic mistrust between the United States and China. First and the most 
important factor is the security reason. The United States has perceived 
modernization of the Chinese military power as a security concern for the U.S. 
military posture in the Asia-Pacific. According to the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 37; Department of 
Defense, 2014, p. 17), the U.S. Department of Defense clearly expressed deep 
security concerns related to the Chinese military modernization, given the lack of 
transparency and unclear ultimate goal of the military modernization. More 
importantly, the development of Anti-Access/Access Denial (A2/AD) capabilities 
of China has posed a serious security threat to the U.S. military bases and freedom 
of navigation of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific Ocean (Department of Defense, 
2010, p. 32). The development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), Anti-
Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs), and submarines, for instance, are believed to aim 
at deterring American carrier strike groups from entering the contested area in the 
Western Pacific.  
 
Moreover, China‘s space and cyberspace programs are even more harmful to the 
U.S. security. In 2007, China successfully tested its direct-ascent anti-satellite 
(ASAT) weapons. This is a remarkable turn of China‘s development of military 
technology, and this contributes to China‘s Anti-Access/Access Denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities. China‘s People‘s Liberation of Army (PLA) is believed to have 
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closely observed and been impressed by the significance of information 
technology warfare in the first Gulf War, the war in former Yugoslavia, and the 
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. PLA Senior Colonel Wang Baocun, an 
expert on information technology and cyber warfare at the PLA affiliated 
Academy of Military Sciences, acknowledged that the PLA closely monitored the 
progress of the first and second Gulf Wars in terms of strategic and tactical 
operations employed by the U.S. military in combat missions (Cheng, 2011, p. 
158).  
 
Similarly, a group of experts in security studies at Strategic Studies Institute of the 
U.S. Army War College argued that even though China strongly opposed the 
bombing campaign by NATO in former Yugoslavia, China paid a very close 
attention to the military operation of NATO in terms of a new Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMAs), the awesome presentation of air power, and the 
integration of information technology warfare (Scobell, Lai, & Kamphausen, 
2011, p. 9-10). In what is called ―informatized warfare,‖ June Teufel Dreyer 
observes:  
 
The key to victory would no longer involve the integration of land, sea, 
and air forces on a three-dimensional battlefield; instead, war would be 
fought on a five-dimensional battlefield comprising land, sea, sky, space, 
and electromagnetic spheres embedded in a network-centric context 
(Dreyer, 2011, p. 38).  
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China‘s People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) is impressed by operational integration: 
Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligent, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR). The PLA, however, sees C4ISR as both a strength and 
weakness. Technological advancement has given advantages to military 
warfighting power, while dependence on technology represents a weakness of the 
military in case of unexpected interruption of the integration process. China 
understands this problem well. China‘s development of anti-satellite missiles is 
the clear evidence. Once the U.S. satellite is shot and destroyed, troops on the 
ground, fighter jets in the sky, and warships in the sea will be blind. In this 
context, the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Navy, is subject to vulnerability, 
should its integration operation is interrupted by the adversary‘s cyber attacks.  
 
A second factor contributing to the growing tensions between the United States 
and China is economic issues. Even though China and the United States share the 
same common interests of economic gain, it does not mean that their economic 
relations are smooth.  Henry Kissinger (2011, p. 494), a former U.S. Secretary of 
State and a key architecture of the Sino-U.S. normalization process, pointed out 
that the common economic interests China and America share are interpreted 
based on different perspectives. This is obviously true, given their differences 
over trade policies and regulations. For example, China has taken advantages of 
currency undervaluation to weaken the American export competitiveness in the 
markets where Chinese products are relatively much cheaper than those of 
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America. Equally important, China has paid less attention to the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) highly demanded by the United States. The vast 
of majority of Chinese business organizations, if not all, has illegally used foreign 
technologies, and innovations to produce and sell their productions around the 
world. To respond to this, America has imposed restrictions on sales of high-tech 
products to China. America, however, has paid the high price for this strategy 
since imposing such kind of restrictions also limits the American business 
opportunities to export its products to sell in the international markets.  
 
A third factor contributing to the tensions in Sino-U.S. relations is their 
differences over political ideology. The universal values of democracy, human 
rights, and freedom have long been central to the U.S. foreign policy. The long-
term political engagement and economic incentive were the U.S. policies of 
choice with the hope that as China becomes richer, China will become more 
democratic. In the wake of Shanghai Communique in 1972, the U.S. politicians 
and the U.S. experts in Chinese politics believed that China would be integrated 
into the international system empowered by the Western values, and it was likely 
that the growing China will be freer and more democratic (Bernstiein & Munro, 
2003, p. 2).  
 
The same was true to the projection of former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida 
that the perspective of economic interdependence between Japan and China would 
certainly shape the behavior of the Chinese government (Green, 2014, p. 201). 
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However, half is true. China became prosperous after the integration, and the 
projection of economic interdependence between Japan and China by Prime 
Minister Yoshida is perfectly correct, but China has never adopted any Western 
political value as wished by the United States and Japan.  
 
From the crackdown on the students protesting at the Tiananmen Square, a series 
of arrests of dissidents and pro-human rights activists, the censorships of internet 
freedom, democracy, and other issues of human rights abuses remain the subjects 
of controversial relations between the United States and China. A fluctuation of 
the Sino-U.S. relations with regard to the promotions of democracy should be 
articulated by the most recent cases during the first term of the Obama 
administration.  
 
The first disagreement emerged when President Obama hosted the visit of Dalai 
Lama. During the visit to China in 2010, President Obama was told by his 
counterpart, Chinese President Hu Jintao, that China would be unhappy if the 
United State welcomes the visit of Dalai Lama (Bader, 2012, p. 71.). Referring to 
the ―core interests‖ of China, any meeting with Dalai Lama from Beijing‘s 
perspective is simply a diplomatic gesture to recognize the existence of ―Greater 
Tibet‖ beyond an autonomous zone in Chinese sovereignty (Bader, 2012, p. 75). 
Chinese Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong, according to Bader (2012, p. 74), 
threatened that the decision of Washington to host Dalai Lama could result in a 
cancellation of the trip of President Hu to attend Nuclear Security Summit in the 
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United States. Even though President Hu did not cancel the trip to Washington 
after President Obama hosted Dalai Lama, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 
and State Councilor Dai Bingguo, as Bader (2012, p. 76-77) revealed, sharply 
criticized the U.S. decision during his private conversation with them.  
 
Second, it was the case of Chen Guang Cheng, a blind lawyer and a human rights 
activist who successfully escaped from house arrest in Shandong province, and 
managed to sneak into the American embassy in Beijing in April 2012. Helping 
Chen, whose leg was injured while he was attempting to cross the house gate to 
escape, is consistent with the American commitments to universal values of 
human rights and freedom. However, the American values, as Secretary Clinton 
recalls in her memoir (2014, p.84-85), were in dilemma whether the United States 
should help Chen, and take the risk of losing the chance to have an important 
annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) with China.  
 
Chinese authorities were quickly aware of Chen‘s presence at the U.S. embassy in 
Beijing and demanded the embassy handover Chen to the Chinese authorities. Cui 
Tiankai, who was later appointed as a Chinese Ambassador to the United States, 
warned of serious consequences of the U.S.-China relations if the problem was 
not properly solved. Cui reportedly has threatened the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State Kurt Campbell during their private discussion: ―turn Chen over to us 
immediately. If you really care about the U.S.-China relationship, that is what 
you‘ll do‖ (Clinton, 2014, p. 88). Although the negotiation was finally reached 
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between the United States and China on the ground that Chen would go to the 
United States where he was admitted to studying law at the New York University, 
the case is an example of how the controversial human rights issues affect Sino-
U.S. relations.  
 
The last and the most controversial issue is Taiwan. The U.S. commitments to 
democracy, and pressure of domestic politics, and law have obligated the United 
States to protect Taiwan from being militarily invaded by China. The U.S. sales of 
weapons to Taiwan, of course, have been strongly protested by China bringing the 
U.S.-China relations down. For example, a US$ 6.4 billion long-awaited sale of 
arms package was approved by President Bush in October 2008, just months 
before he left the office. In early 2010, President Obama authorized another sale 
of arms to Taiwan. None of the arms sales has gone unprotested by China.   
 
As China‘s economy continues to grow, so does the progress of its military 
modernization. In addition to the rapid and massive military build-up, which is 
causing a security concern for its Asian neighbors, China has become even more 
assertive in the recent years when dealing with maritime territorial disputes in 
both the South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS). China has 
aggressively expanded the areas of its military operation and patrol in the 
contested zones. The People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), for instance, 
forcibly took control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012. In 
the same year of 2012, the long-standing unsettled territorial disputes of 
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Senkaku/Diaoyu in the ECS between China and Japan became a flashpoint again 
when Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced that he would like to buy, and 
nationalize the islands into the properties of the Japanese government. Soon after 
that, the tensions started to grow. China‘s PLAN, People‘s Liberation Army Air 
Force (PLAAF), and coast guard have increased their patrol missions around the 
disputed islands. The PLAAF has many times illegally entered Japanese airspace 
prompting Japan to scramble its fighter jets to intercept, and push China‘s PLAAF 
out of its airspace.  
 
It looks like there is no sign of any retreat from the Chinese military forces. In 
contrast, the trends of assertiveness of PLA keep growing. Japan‘s Air Self-
Defense Force in 2014, for example, scrambled their fighter jets to intercept 
Chinese planes for 400 times (Reynolds, 2015). In the South China Sea (SCS), 
China successfully constructed the artificial islands and built military bases where 
at least one of the two runways is ready for Chinese planes to land and take off. 
As Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell (2016, p. 17) have pointed out in 
their recent report, China has so far conducted at least 17 times of land 
reclamations on some reefs in the SCS in less than two years. A 3,000-meter long 
runway, for example, was completely constructed on Fiery Cross Reef, and 
another similar runway is under the construction on Subi Reef. 
 
The rise of China has become a subject of debates in the United States. A rising 
China is perceived differently by a different group of people. From the 
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perspective of liberalism, the roles of the military are limited by the economic 
interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2003, p. 239). The interests generated by 
economic cooperation will prevent states from going to war against each other. 
Some liberals, such as Robert Sutter and Russell Ong acknowledge that there are 
competitions between the United States and China, but argue that the gains from 
cooperation between the two countries can outweigh the negative impacts (Sutter, 
2010, p. 275; Ong, 2012, p. 146). Economic interdependence and a number of 
common security issues, such as North Korea‘s nuclear program, terrorism, the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and piracy are important to 
shape Sino-U.S. relations not to escalate into wars (Ikenberry, 2013, p. 72). The 
competitions, according to John Ikenberry (2013, p. 57), are taking place in the 
current international system as China is rising within the system with no intention 
to challenge the existing order. Ikenberry is optimistic that the Westphalian 
system is still practical, and it will manage security stability.  
 
On the contrary, those believing in realism are pessimistic about the rise of China.  
According to realism, when a state becomes more wealthy, it tends to build up its 
army and seek to change the existing status quo, which is not in its favor (Gilpin, 
1981; Schweller, 1999, p. 2). Within this context, the armed conflict is highly 
likely. Some realists including John Mearsheimer, Aaron Friedberg, and Michael 
Green are concerned about the rise of China, given the growing security tensions 
between China and the United States, and fears that the tensions will escalate into 
a war between the rising power and the existing hegemonic power. John 
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Mearsheimer (2001a, p. 57, 401; 2006, p. 162), for example, argued that China is 
not a status quo state. Thus, if China keeps rising, its area of interests will expand. 
China will develop its own version of the Monroe Doctrine to push the United 
States out of the Asia-Pacific. Sharing the same bed and having different dreams, 
economic interdependence and constructive engagement cannot shape China‘s 
foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2001a, p. 57-58; Friedberg, 2011, p. 38; 2012, p. 55; 
Green, 2016, p. 16). The growing assertiveness of China is a clear evidence of the 
realist argument.  In this context, the U.S. engagement strategy does not work 
effectively.  
 
At the beginning of the Obama administration, Michael Green (2009, p. 17), a 
senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an 
associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University criticized 
both the Clinton and Bush administrations for not having strong Asia policy. 
Green (2009, p. 18) argues that China‘s military modernization has gone far 
beyond what is needed for deterring Taiwan independence, and posed threats to 
the American military posture in the Asia-Pacific. As China continues to rise, 
realists have called for a stronger and tougher policy toward China (Mearsheimer, 
2001b, p. 401-402; Friedberg, 2007, p.43). 
 
As the debate between realists and liberals is going on, the announcement of the 
U.S. rebalance to Asia by President Obama in 2011 signified a remarkable turning 
point of the U.S. foreign policy in the early 21
st
 century. The U.S. rebalance, as 
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the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined (2011, p. 58), covers ―six key 
lines of actions:‖ 
 
(1) Strengthening bilateral security alliances;  
(2) Deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including 
China;  
(3) Engaging with regional multilateral institutions;  
(4) Expanding trade and investment;  
(5) Forging abroad-based military presence; 
(6) And advancing democracy and human rights. 
 
Based on the key lines above, the U.S. rebalance is made of prescriptions of both 
realism and liberalism. However, it looks like the U.S. regional engagement is 
more selective in terms of security cooperation with the allies and strategic 
partners, negotiations of free trade agreement, and promotion of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), which exclude China. The implication of this exclusion is that 
balance of power is at work. The U.S. rebalance to Asia is, therefore, realism. 
While there are variants of realism, the thesis argues that the U.S. rebalance to 
Asia is best explained by neoclassical realism.  
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
 
1.2.1. To examine why the United States adopted the rebalance as 
its new foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific.  
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1.2.2. To contribute to existing literature in the field of 
international relations, particularly the U.S.-China relations 
in the 21
st
 century.  
1.2.3. To find out what theory of international relations can best 
explain the rebalance. 
1.3. Research Questions 
 
1.3.1. Primary research question: Why the U.S. rebalance to 
Asia is best explained by neoclassical realism? 
1.3.2. Secondary research questions: 
1.3.2.1 Why did the United States adopt the 
rebalance to Asia?  
a. What are the interests of the United States in 
Asia and how can the United States maintain 
its interests?  
b. Is the U.S. military strategy in the Pacific 
changed by the rebalance?   
1.4. Research Methodology 
 
 
The research is conducted in the form of qualitative research, and based on both 
primary and secondary data. For the primary data, information will be collected 
from official institutions such the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of 
States and the Ministry of Defense of China and Japan. Equally important, the 
information of statistics of trade and economic cooperation will be collected from 
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official sources such International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and 
the U.S. Census Bureau. For the secondary data, the research will use the existing 
literature such as books, journal articles, working papers and newspapers.  
 
In order to carry out this research, doing the literature review is the first and most 
important step. As mentioned in the background above, the rebalance literally 
matches policy prescriptions of both realism and liberalism. However, it seems 
that the rebalance is theoretically realism rather than liberalism, given the U.S. 
selective engagements in the region that discriminate against China. In the 
Chapter Two, I will first review the literature for general concepts of realism. 
Next, I will discuss the debates of each variant of realism. Finally, I will examine 
the rebalance in the light of theoretical predictions of the variants of realism.  
 
In Chapter Three, I will answer the first secondary research question: why did the 
United States adopt the rebalance to Asia? I argue that the shift in the American 
foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific is driven by the growing economic and security 
interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. The promotion of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), the conclusion of the new U.S.-Japan security 
guidelines, and the expansion of the U.S. strategic partnerships with some Asian 
countries are the evidence to prove the reasons why the United States shifted its 
foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific.  
 
19 
 
In Chapter Four, I will analyze which variant of realism best explains the 
rebalance. In order to do so, I depend on the debates of each variant of realism in 
the literature review part of Chapter Two. Also, I will answer the secondary 
research question: Is the U.S. military strategy changed by the U.S. rebalance? I 
argued that the U.S. military strategy is not driven by the announcement of the 
U.S. rebalance policy. In fact, the U.S. defense posture had changed years before 
the rebalance was announced in 2011.  In the concluding chapter, I will wrap up 
the arguments and explain briefly why neoclassical realism best explains the U.S. 
rebalance to Asia. Also, I will highlight some of the research gaps that this thesis 
leaves unanswered.  
1.5. Research Significance  
 
None of the past great powers has maintained its ever-lasting dominant role in the 
history of international politics. The rises and the falls of great powers, therefore, 
are common cycles. Managing the rising power, however, is not common and 
easy. Some cases of the rising powers ended up with wars. The Peloponnesian 
War, the Napoleonic War, the First and Second World Wars, for examples, were 
fought by the rising powers seeking changes in the international system. The 
pattern of the current Sino-U.S. relations seems to make no difference from the 
competition between the rising power and the established power, given the rise of 
China in the system dominated by the United States. However, what makes Sino-
U.S. relations unique is their special relations, in which cooperation and 
competition for the sphere of influence take place at the same time.  
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Several researches of the U.S. foreign policy towards China under the U.S. 
rebalance to Asia have been done. However, many previous discussions paid 
more attention to the evolution of the U.S. foreign policy to China during the 
Obama administration rather than tracing back to see some changes of the U.S. 
foreign policy toward China prior to the Obama administration. Changes of the 
deployments of the U.S. naval assets, for example, were initiated in the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review. Similarly, the current Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED) between the United States and China is originally from the 
Strategic Economic Dialogue initiated during the Bush administration.  
 
Moreover, some researchers have discussed the rebalance based on the general 
theories of international relations. Some see the rebalance as a containment 
strategy (White, 2012, p. 28; Kurlantzick, 2015, p. 5; Macausland, 2015, p. 69). 
Of course, it is realism. Some others see the rebalance as an engagement strategy, 
which is supported by liberalism (Shambaugh, 2013a, p. 22; 2013b, p. 17; 
Ikenberry, 2013, p. 72; Bateman, 2015, p. 71). However, not many of them have 
given a more precise theoretical explanation to the rebalance.  
 
This thesis agrees that the U.S. rebalance is theoretically realism. Realism, 
however, is quite broad, given its variants of classical realism, neorealism, and 
neoclassical realism. In order to explain the rebalance in a comprehensive way, a 
more specific theoretical explanation is needed. Therefore, the significance of this 
research is: first, to construct a much clearer image of the rebalance by offering a 
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theoretical explanation in neoclassical realism, which has been left unanswered by 
the previous researchers; second, to examine if the changes of the U.S. military 
strategy are driven by the U.S. rebalance to Asia.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I will start first by reviewing the general concepts of realism 
because understanding the general concepts of realism provides me the 
fundamental basis and advantages to examine the three variants of realism: 
classical realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism in a more critical way. 
Next, I will examine the U.S. rebalance through the lens of realism.  
2.1. Basic Concepts of Realism 
 
Realism is one of the prominent theories of international relations. Realism, 
however, has three main variants. They are classical realism, neorealism and 
neoclassical realism. Even though each variant offers a different theoretical 
explanation, there are some significant assumptions that every variant of realism 
shares in common. The first assumption is state (nation-state) as an actor in the 
international system (Waltz, 1979, p. 95; Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 10; 
Morgenthau, 2006, p. 4). Studying the Western political thoughts in the ancient 
time, a political scientist Robert Gilpin (1996, p. 7) makes a good conclusion that 
―the fundamental idea of realism is Aristotle's observation that man is a political 
animal. Men find their being as members of social groups to which they give their 
loyalty and for which they are willing to die.‖ In other words, people do not 
confront each other individually, but in a group within a unified society. State, 
therefore, is an actor. 
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The second assumption is the state of anarchy. As Mearsheimer (1994-95, p. 10) 
argues a nation-state is an ―independent political unit in the international system.‖ 
There is no higher structure of power than a nation-state. With the absence of 
world government, the international system generates anarchy, uncertainty, and 
sense of mistrust. Living in such an anarchic environment, as Waltz (1979, p. 111) 
argues, states must rely on their own means to survive, and that is a ―self-help‖ 
system. Anarchy, as Waltz (1979, p. 114) pointed out, does not only mean there is 
no world government, but also disorder and chaos. ―Self-help‖ is then an 
important action states need to depend on whatever means and resources they 
have to protect their own security.  
 
The third assumption is that inter-state relations are prone to conflicts. Even 
though states cooperate in the international system, competitions do not entirely 
disappear. Cooperation, in a realist thought, is possible if such cooperation gives 
states the relative gains (Waltz, 1979, p. 105; Mastanduno, 1991, p. 80; 
Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 12). In this context, states keep struggling to compete 
with each other to maximize their interests. The balance of power, therefore, 
becomes a law of nature (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 179; Waltz, 2000, p. 27). As 
Nicolas Spykman argues ―a world without struggle would be a world in which life 
had ceased to exist‖ (cited in Schweller & Priess, 1997, p. 6).  Whether conflicts 
are driven by the human nature or the consequences of interactions between states 
in the international system as classical realists and neorealists argue in their 
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debates (which I will discuss in the section of theoretical debates), the conflicts, in 
the realist thought, are inevitable. 
 
The last important assumption is power as the fundamental factor of international 
politics. In a letter to respond to his friends, Marcus Tullius Cicero, a Roman 
philosopher and politician simply asked ―for what can be done against force 
without force?‖ (cited in Waltz, 2001, p. 159). Realism believes that the final 
resolution of the conflicts is the use of force. Since each nation-state has its own 
military power, we can never be sure if we will not be attacked by others 
sometime in the future. Thus, the only way to survive is to maximize the power 
(Mearsheimer, 1994-95, p. 12; Morgenthau, 2006, p. 29).  
 
In short, although there are different variants of realism, the concepts of states as 
actors, the system of anarchy, international relations as sources of conflicts, and 
the power maximization are all the basic assumptions that all realists share in 
common. While the different variants of realism provide different theoretical 
explanations in different contexts, examining the critical debates of each variant 
of realism is fundamentally important to analyze state‘s foreign policy.  
2.2. The Debates of the Three Variants of Realism 
 
Even though the three variants of realism share a number of key assumptions in 
common, disagreements still exist. The ―disagreements within the realist 
tradition,‖ as Schweller and Priess observed (1997, p. 6-7), ―arise from basic 
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philosophical differences, from placing emphasis on different assumptions or, 
more often, from varying interpretations of the preceding assumptions.‖ The 
different view of power, for instance, is a good case to compare. Classical realists 
argue that power is the ultimate goal of states (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 10). 
Neorealists, however, argue that power is not the ultimate goal, but just means to 
maintain security. In the system of anarchy, the ultimate goal of states is to 
maximize the security to survive (Waltz, 1979, p. 126; 1990, p. 34-36). Within 
this sense, a comprehensive analysis of state‘s foreign policy is impossible unless 
and until we understand the disagreements among the three variants of realism.  
2.2.1. Classical Realism: Domestic Politics Drives States’ Foreign Policy 
 
Classical realism is one of the key theories in international relations. The 
assumptions of classical realism are basically drawn from sociology and history, 
particularly from the Western European history (Taliaferro; Lobell & Ripsman, 
2009, p. 19-21). The primary conception of classical realism is central to the 
human behavior in the state of nature. Individual perceptions of people, therefore, 
is an essential driving force of state‘s foreign policy.  
 
In the state of nature, as classical realism argues, the human nature is bad, selfish, 
cruel and untrusted. According to Thomas Hobbes (1998, p. 82-83), men were 
equally born, and this equality leads to equal freedom to compete for interest, 
security, and reputation. In the state of nature, people tend to have conflict when 
they want the same thing, which they cannot share in common.  Living in the state 
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of anarchy, security is what people concern the most. Hobbes (1998, p. 84) argued 
that ―out of civil states, there is always war of everyone against everyone.‖ That is 
why people sacrifice some of their freedom to live in a civil state in exchange for 
security protection. As a French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues, in the 
state of nature even farming is not possible for people. The disorder of society 
caused by the human nature makes it possible that whoever comes first can 
harvest the crops cultivated by other people (cited in Waltz, 2001, p. 171).  As 
time passes for centuries, the human nature does not change, and it will remain 
unchanged in the future. It is true. As Morgenthau observes: 
 
Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their root, has not 
changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece 
endeavored to these law. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a virtue in 
political theory, nor is old age a defect (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 4) 
 
In the history of the Peloponnesian War between the two most powerful Greek 
city-states, Thucydides (1998, p. 481) argues that ―war is waged by interest, pride, 
and fears.‖ The rise of Athens, as Thucydides wrote, was then perceived by Sparta 
as a looming threat to its interests and security. Similarly, even Kenneth Waltz, a 
prominent supporter of neorealism, agrees that state‘s foreign policy is partly 
influenced by man‘s behavior. To explain the human behavior, which is known as 
the First Image in his book Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 
Waltz (2001, p. 16) argues ―the locus of important causes of war is found in the 
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nature and behavior of man. Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected 
aggressive impulses, from stupidity.‖  
 
While all of these are discussed to reflect how the human nature or domestic 
politics matters in state‘s foreign policy, it is important to emphasize that the 
human nature in this context refers to the perceptions of statesmen rather than 
people in general. Waltz (2001, p. 80) carefully clarifies ―To that the state acts is 
to speak metonymically. We say that the state acts when we people in it act, just 
as we say that the pot boils when we mean that the water in it boils.‖ Even though 
states are actors in the international politics, states cannot make foreign policy on 
their own, but states‘ political leaders do (Schweller, 2006, p. 47). Based on this, 
the perceptions of the President, Prime Minister, Ministers, military commanders, 
and other people involving in decision-making process matter in states‘ foreign 
policy. Thus, state‘s foreign policy is driven by domestic politics.   
 
Equally important, classical realism sees interstates relations as a zero-sum game. 
To put in a simple term, classical realism believes that ―my loss is your gain, and 
my gain is your loss.‖ Thucydides once famously said ―the strong do what they 
can and the weak suffer what they must‖ (Strassler, 1996, p. 352). The state of 
nature has never liberated people from such an untrusted environment. As 
Rousseau argues: 
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It is quite true that it would be much better for all men to remain always at 
peace. But so long as there is no security for this, everyone, having no 
guarantee that he can avoid war, is anxious to begin it at the moment 
which suits his own interest and so forestall a neighbour, who would not 
fail to forestall the attack in his turn, at any moment favourable to himself, 
so that many wars, even offensive wars, are rather in the nature of unjust 
precautions for the protection of the assailant's own possessions than a 
device for seizing those of others (cited in Lipson, 1984, p. 15). 
 
With the absence of higher authority to guarantee security and order, a reciprocal 
cooperation is highly unlikely. If we treat someone as a friend, that person may or 
may not treat us back as a friend, but if we treat someone as an enemy, that person 
will become our enemy.  
 
To defend his position not to launch a policy to contain China after Deng 
Xiaoping ordered the crackdown on a peaceful protest at the Tiananmen Square in 
1989, Joseph Nye (2013, p. 13), then an Assistant Secretary of Defense during the 
Clinton Administration, argues that the United States cannot contain China for 
two reasons: ―if we treated China as an enemy, we were guaranteeing an enemy in 
the future. If we treated China as a friend, we could not guarantee friendship, but 
we kept open the possibility of more benign futures.‖ Nye‘s argument reflects an 
important point, which is central to concerns of classical realism, the 
unreciprocated cooperation.  
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As Mearsheimer (1994-95, p. 13) points out, even though realism focuses 
fundamentally on power competition, it does not mean that inter-state cooperation 
is impossible. States, in fact, are concerned that their partners will finally get a 
greater share of relative gains from the cooperation. Classical realism, according 
to Mearsheimer, considers the relative gains as cheating in state cooperation.  
 
The case of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks-II (SALT-II) is a good case to study.  
Opponents of the treaty argued that the treaty gave the Soviet Union more 
advantages than the United States, given the lack of mechanisms to monitor the 
compliance of the Soviet Union, and the difficulties to conduct on-site inspections 
of some specific weapon systems (Lipson, 1984, p. 16). On surface, SALT-II gave 
the United States a great deal of advantages for national security as the nuclear 
arsenals were significantly reduced. Technically, it did not. The lacks of technical 
mechanisms to fully inspect the implementation of the treaty gave the Soviet 
Union technical advantages not to fully comply with the agreed principles. In 
other words, there were rooms for the Soviet Union to cheat. In principle, it 
seemed that the United States was winning the game. In reality, the United States 
was not.    
 
All in all, the key assumption of classical realism is state of nature, in which 
human nature is selfish, cruel and untrusted. While classical realists discuss state‘s 
foreign policy, they make it clear that states cannot make foreign policy 
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themselves, but their governments do. The perceptions of statesmen matter in 
states‘ foreign policy. Equally important, selfishness of human being and the 
absence of world government generate the state of anarchy and insecurity. States, 
therefore, must depend on their own means for security and survival. Inter-state 
relations, in the view of classical realism, are zero-sum games. Maximizing the 
power, of course, is the only thing a state can do to survive.   
2.2.2. Neorealism: International System Drives States’ Foreign Policy 
 
Another variant of realism is neorealism. Even though neorealism derived from 
classical realism, the views of the two theories over the issues of international 
politics are different. For example, the state of anarchy, from the perspective of 
classical realism, is caused by unchanged human nature struggling for power and 
interests (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 179). However, neorealism argues the state of 
anarchy is caused by the absence of world government in the international system, 
in which states interact (Waltz, 1979, p. 114). In this section, I will discuss the key 
concepts of neorealism, and examine how neorealism views the international 
politics differently from classical realism.  
 
First, unlike classical realism, which argues state‘s foreign policy is driven by 
domestic politics, neorealism argues that state‘s foreign policy is driven by state‘s 
interactions in the international system. By distinguishing the three images, Waltz 
provides an excellent level of analysis of state‘s foreign policy.  In the First 
Image, Waltz (2001, pp. 16; 80-81) acknowledges that human nature matters in 
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foreign policy. However, he argues further that everything is based on human 
decision, and humans are influenced by several motives. If so, assuming that 
humans are ―single-minded‖ as ―economic maximizers,‖ is not accurate (Waltz, 
1990, p. 27). Therefore, in order to explain things in a more comprehensive way, 
Waltz suggests that it is important to look beyond the human factors. Waltz argues 
that the Second Image, domestic political system, is also relevant to state‘s foreign 
policy. Capitalist countries, for example, support free trades, while Socialist 
countries view free trades as another form of exploitation, given their 
disadvantages in free trades.  
 
The Second Image, according to Waltz (2001, p. 125), is that ―the internal 
structure of states determines not only the form and use of military force but 
external behavior generally.‖ The ideological competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, for example, took place due to 
the different domestic political system. The United States perceived the 
Communism as threat. For example, in 1953, Richard Nixon, then the U.S. Vice 
President, claimed that people could have lived in a peaceful world if there were 
no Communist threat (cited in Waltz, 2001, p. 157). The ideological competition 
is the evidence of how different domestic political system matters in a state‘s 
foreign policy.  
 
Even though the First and Second Images are relevant to state‘s foreign policy, 
they are domestic politics. Hence, they have less influence on states‘ foreign 
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policy. However, the Third Image, the international system, is different. The 
international system, according to Waltz (1990, p. 29), is defined by two 
important factors: ―the ordering principles of the system,‖ and ―the distribution of 
capability across units.‖ The state of anarchy is generated when a state interacts 
with other states within the international system. Because states have a different 
level of power, their relative power distributions in the system constrain them 
from doing some certain things. This is how the international system reshapes 
states‘ foreign policy and that is the core value of Waltz‘s Third Image.  
 
Second, the concept of power as means and ends are also differently viewed by 
classical realism and neorealism. As briefly mentioned above, classical realism 
sees power as the ultimate goal, but neorealism sees power as means for security, 
the ultimate goal of state. Maximizing the power does not always guarantee 
state‘s survival because having too much power is as dangerous as having too 
little power. ―Weakness,‖ according to Waltz (1990s, p. 36), ―may invite an attack 
that greater strength would dissuade an adversary from launching. Excessive 
strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their effort.‖ A 
coalition of states in Europe, for instance, was formed to stop the expansion of 
French Emperor Napoleon in the early 19
th
 century. Two similar coalitions were 
formed to stop German expansions in both First and Second World Wars. That is 
why power is not the ultimate goal, but security is.  
 
The third issue that classical realism and neorealism have a different view is the 
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concept of ―capability.‖ When classical realism discusses the term ―capability,‖ 
according to Schweller and Priess (1997, p. 7), it tends to see capabilities as a 
relative power distribution of power between state and state rather than the 
relative power distribution among states within the international system. Waltz 
(1990, p. 34) points out that classical realism sees causes and effects of state‘s 
foreign policy run in ―one direction‖ from state‘s interaction to the result of the 
interaction.  
 
In contrast, neorealism sees the causal relations run in ―two directions.‖ The 
states‘ capabilities are not just a relative distribution of power between state and 
state, but also a relative distribution of power among states within the 
international system (Waltz, 1990, p. 34; Schweller and Priess, 1997, p. 7). In 
other words, classical realism sees relative power as relations between state and 
state, while neorealism sees relative power as not just relations between state and 
state, but also relations that a state has with other states in the international 
system.   
 
Finally, different from classical realism focusing on the absolute gains, neorealism 
argues that if the absolute gains are not possible, states are still willing to 
cooperate if they can get a greater share of relative gains. Waltz contends:  
 
When faced with possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel 
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelling to 
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ask not ―Will both of us gain?‖ but ―Who will gain more?‖ If an expected 
gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state will use its 
disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy 
the other (Waltz, 1979, p. 105).  
 
The unequal gains generated from cooperation among states will enable states 
gaining a greater share of relative gains to have more political power than other 
states. While no security guarantee is available in the anarchic international 
system, the more state gains, the more security it has.   
2.2.3. Neoclassical Realism: Domestic Politics, International System, 
Gaps in Relative Gains Drive States’ Foreign Policy  
 
Thucydides said ―the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must,‖ for more than two thousand years ago (Strassler, 1996, p. 352). During the 
wars in the early 19
th
 century, French Emperor Napoleon once famously said that 
―God stand at the big battalion,‖ (cited in Nye, 2011, p. 25). In the mid-20th 
century, Mao Zedong, who was then leading the people‘s revolutionary war in 
China, was quoted as saying ―political power grows from barrel of guns‖ (Wei, 
2002, p. 229).  
 
As time passes, there is no doubt that material resources remain the fundamental 
power parameter of state‘s foreign policy. However, the causal relations linking 
power to the foreign policy making process are not clearly articulated. In other 
words, it is not clear how power can change a state‘s foreign policy. Seeking a 
35 
 
middle way between classical realism and neorealism, neoclassical realism 
manages to fill this gap by offering a theoretical explanation of causal relations 
between power and states‘ foreign policy.   
 
Not different from classical realism and neorealism, neoclassical realism shares 
the common sense of the anarchy in the international politics, security and state‘s 
survival. However, neoclassical realism, according to Gideon Rose (1998, p. 146-
147), argues that the causal relations between power and foreign policy are central 
to the perceptions of political leaders over their relative power or resources and 
the systemic pressures. To put it in a simple term, neoclassical realism argues that 
both perception and the system pressures matter in a state‘s foreign policy.  We 
might not fully understand power if we fail to understand what people are 
thinking about their relative power and the external environment. Rose, who 
coined the term of neoclassical realism in 1998, argues: 
 
The scope and ambition of a country‘s foreign policy is driven first and 
foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its 
relative power capabilities. This is why they are realist. However, the 
impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and 
complex, because systemic pressure must be translated through 
intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical 
(Rose, 1998, p. 146).  
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Although classical realism and neorealism are important theories for international 
politics, both theories have their own weaknesses. Classical realism, for example, 
focuses mainly on domestic politics. The ―pure unit-level explanations,‖ as Rose 
(1998, p. 148) points out, are insufficient to analyze states‘ foreign policy simply 
because states with the similar political system do not always do the same things. 
The United States and Britain, for instance, are democratic states, but Britain‘s 
foreign policy expansions are not as active as those of the United States. In 
addition, analyzing states‘ foreign policy by focusing purely on domestic politics, 
as Waltz (1990, p. 27) argues, seems to be misguided in the sense that we assume 
that men are single-minded, while they are not.   
 
Neorealism, on the contrary, pays attentions largely to the systemic structure and 
gives less significance to domestic politics. Neoclassical realism, however, argues 
that paying attention to ―systemic factors alone is bound to be inaccurate much of 
the time‖ (Rose, 1998, p. 152). Fareed Zakaria (1998, p. 187) argues ―nations do 
not formulate and implement foreign policy and extract resources to that end, 
governments do.‖ ―State-centered realism,‖ as Zakaria calls, is about the behavior 
of statesmen as decision makers to influence foreign policy. Neoclassical realists 
believe that analyzing states‘ foreign policy is not only about how the 
international system changes, but also about how the changes within the 
international system are perceived by political leaders. The translations of the 
changes, as neoclassical realists argue, are certainly a product of unit-level 
intervening variables, in which perceptions of decision makers and state‘s 
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domestic politics matter in foreign policy making processes.  
 
In addition to linking the perceptions and the systemic pressures together, 
neoclassical realism also concentrates mainly on states‘ relative power. ―By 
making relative power as their chief independent variable,‖ neoclassical realists 
argue that neoclassical realism does not seek security maximization as ―the 
highest end‖ like neorealism does (Waltz, 1979, p. 126), but neoclassical realism 
reacts in response to the growing uncertainties and anarchy in the international 
system by seeking greater control to shape the uncertain external environment 
(Rose, 1998, 152). Theoretically, neoclassical realism is a status quo strategy that 
a hegemonic state applies in order to maintain its existing leadership in the current 
system. As Rose portrays:  
Regardless of the myriad ways that states may define their interests, this 
school argues, they are likely to want more rather than less external 
influence, and pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do 
so. The central empirical prediction of neoclassical realism is thus that 
over the long term the relative amount of material power resources 
countries possess will shape the magnitude and ambition – the envelope, 
as it were – of their foreign policies: as their relative power rises states will 
seek more influence abroad, and as it falls their actions and ambitions will 
be scaled back accordingly (Rose, 1998, p. 152).  
In fact, both classical realism and neorealism do discuss relative power 
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distribution. Nonetheless, they see relative power distribution in different ways. 
Classical realism sees the relative power distributions as a form of the balance of 
power between state and state, while neorealism sees the relative power 
distributions as a form of the balance of power among states in the international 
system. Neither of them discusses how the changes in relative power, particularly 
the changes accumulated in the long run, will shape a state‘s foreign policy. Waltz 
(1979, p. 105), indeed, came very close to discussing the relative gains as he 
wrote that when states cooperate, they do not simply ask ―will both of us gain?‖ 
but they tend to ask ―who will gain more?‖ Waltz, however, failed to explain 
clearly how the changes in relative gains affect a state‘s foreign policy in the long 
run.  
 
In addition to the unit-level intervening variables, neoclassical realism 
concentrates on another intervening variable, the changes of state‘s strength 
(changes of power and material resources). In his book From Wealth to Power: 
the Unusual Origins of America's World Role, Fareed Zakaria (1998, p.5) 
observes that the U.S. foreign policy did not expand much before 1890 even 
though the United States by the end of the 19
th
 century might have already 
become one of the three or four richest counties in the world. The main reason, as 
Zakaria argues, is because ―policymakers fail to perceive the shift in their 
country‘s relative economic position.‖ Within this sense, the expansion of state‘s 
foreign policy depends on not only changes of relative power but also the 
perceptions of political leaders over the changes.  
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In the early 19
th
 century, U.S. President John Quincy Adams warned ―country 
should not go abroad in search for monsters to destroy.‖ The U.S. foreign policy, 
however, reversed in the early 20
th
 century when President Woodrow Wilson 
decided to go to war to make ―the world safe for democracy‖ (Rose, 1998, p. 
169). These changes, according to neoclassical realists, were driven by the 
increase in relative power the United States acquired for decades between the 
Adams and Wilson administrations (Rose, 1998, p. 170). Brian Rathbun (2008, p. 
301-302) argues that ―power is powerful only if it can be used, and power can be 
used only if it can be mobilized.‖ Mobilizing the power is what states are 
expected to do to have a political unity in order to respond to the external 
environment through foreign policy designs and implementations. Neoclassical 
realism offers an explanation how domestic politics is connected with state‘s 
foreign policy.  That is why the U.S. expansion of foreign policy took place in the 
early 1900s, but not sooner than that.  
 
In neoclassical realism, the term ―relative power‖ does not mean just how much 
power a state has, but it also means how well the power can help a state to survive 
and lead the system in the long term perspectives (Snidal, 1993, p. 172). Waltz 
(2000, p. 27) wrote that the balance of power is not the things that states do for 
today, but for tomorrow. This is simply because realist theory can only predict 
that if the balance of power is interrupted, it will be naturally restored at sometime 
in the future. Unfortunately, realist theory cannot say when exactly the balance of 
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power will come. Since states are not sure about other‘s intention in the future, 
they have to pay attention to the cooperation to observe how the increase of power 
of their partners will shape their foreign policy (Grieco, 1993, p. 128).  
Mastanduno summarized the concept of relative power as:  
 
Relative position matters because nation-states exist in anarchy, without a 
higher governing authority. Anarchy breeds fear and distrust, leading 
nation-states to worry, at the extreme, that they will be conquered or 
destroyed by their more powerful counterparts. Even if nation-states do 
not fear for their physical survival, they worry that a decrease in their 
power capabilities relative to those of other nation-states will compromise 
their political autonomy, expose them to the influence attempts of others, 
or lessen their ability to prevail in political disputes with allies and 
adversaries (Mastanduno, 1991, p. 78).  
 
However, the sensitivity of relative gains sometimes limits the possibilities of 
cooperation among states. According to Grieco (1990, p. 44-45; 1993, p. 128), 
states will reject cooperation, even though they are guaranteed to get benefits from 
the cooperation if that cooperation gives their partners a greater share of relative 
gain. The sensitive of relative gains might even put more pressures on states to 
give up their gains in absolute term if, by doing so, they can narrow the gaps in 
relative gains favoring their partners (Grieco, 1990, pp. 44-45; 1993, p. 128; 
Mastanduno, 1991, p. 79). The sensitivity of relative gains, according to 
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neoclassical realism, stems from a state‘s concerns that the gaps in relative gains 
that its partners get at the current time can lead to the changes of its partner‘s 
relative power in the long run. If so, its partners will be able to depend on the 
increases of relative power to change their foreign policy, and become its 
adversaries in the future.  
 
In short, neoclassical realism seeks middle ground to fill out the incomplete image 
that is left by neorealism. Although Waltz is still strongly defending his Third 
Image, the system of international politics, he concludes that a comprehensive 
understanding of international politics is not possible unless and until First and 
Second Images are incorporated. Waltz acknowledges:  
 
The Third Image describes the framework of world politics, but without 
the First and Second Images there can be no knowledge of the forces that 
determine policy; the First and Second Images describe the forces in world 
politics, but without the Third Image it is impossible to assess their 
importance or predict their result (Waltz, 2001, p. 238).  
 
Neoclassical realism sets up connections between classical realism and neorealism 
by emphasizing unit-level variable and changes in relative power. Instead of 
trying to maximize the security, neoclassical realism, of which relative power is 
chief independent variable, reacts in response to the uncertainties of the external 
environment to maintain the existing leadership in the system. Neoclassical 
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realism, by definition, is a strategy of status quo.  
43 
 
 Basic arguments  View of domestic politics  View of international 
politics  
Factors to influence on 
state‘s foreign policy  
Classical realism  -Human nature  
-State‘s relation as zero-
sum game 
-Power as ultimate goal  
Very important for state‘s 
foreign policy  
Less relevant to state‘s 
foreign policy  
-State‘s foreign policy is 
driven by domestic 
politics. 
 
-Anarchy is caused by 
human nature.  
Neorealism  -International system 
shapes state‘s foreign 
policy. 
-Power is not the ultimate 
goal but means for 
security.  
Less relevant to state‘s 
foreign policy  
Very important for state‘s 
foreign policy  
-Foreign policy is driven 
by state‘s interaction in 
the international system.  
-Anarchy exists due to the 
absence of world 
government.  
Neoclassical realism  -Pure unit-level is not 
enough. 
-Pure concentration of 
systemic pressure is 
inaccurate.  
-Relative power as chief 
independent variable 
Important for state‘s 
foreign policy 
Important for state‘s 
foreign policy  
-State‘s foreign policy is 
driven by both domestic 
politics and international 
structure.  
-Cooperation is possible, 
given the relative gains.  
Table 1:  Classical  realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism
44 
 
 
2.3. The U.S. Rebalance in Realist Thought 
 
As the U.S. rebalance to Asia marks the shift of the U.S. foreign policy from 
Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, the shift took place amid the 
growing political and security tensions in the Asia-Pacific, largely due to the rise 
of China and its growing assertiveness in maritime territorial disputes. From the 
perspectives of China, the U.S. rebalance is a Cold War-style containment 
strategy designed to prevent China from rising. This kind of argument is 
misguided. First, the U.S.-China relations have been locked in a complex 
economic interdependence.  Second, containment cannot be implemented alone 
by the United States, but by a coalition of allies and friends like it did to the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War (Nye, 2013, p. 39). Since China is rising and 
becoming a key trade partner for many countries including the U.S. allies and 
friends, forming a coalition to contain China is not likely. 
 
It has been years that the United States has implemented its engagement policy 
with China. The complex economic interdependence, as the United States 
believes, is a key foreign policy tool to shape China‘s behavior. The United 
States, for example, supported China to become a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. Integrating China into a global institution such as 
WTO is clearly a sign that liberalism works for the U.S. foreign policy.   
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While economic incentive is important for the United States to shape China‘s 
behavior, it does not mean that China will act as the United States wishes. As 
Susan Shirk (2007, p. 34), a former Deputy Assistant Secretary at the U.S. 
Department of State during the Clinton Administration, argues ―economic 
interdependence breeds caution, but it does not guarantee peace.‖  The growing 
assertiveness of China, as Huge White observes (2012, p. 104), is the evidence 
that economic incentive does not lead to political changes in China.  
 
Furthermore, the more the United States accommodates China, the more China 
sees it as the U.S. weakness. According to Phillip Saunders (2014, p. 160), efforts 
by the Obama administration to intensify the bilateral cooperation and integrate 
China into the global system, in which China is expected to play a more important 
role, is misperceived by China as the sign of the decline of America. Saunder 
(2014, p. 164) argues further that the engagement strategy is not effective in the 
sense that the more America offers China concessions, the more China asks for. A 
“new type of great power relations,” for example, is the evidence that China is 
seeking an equal status in international politics as the United States.   
  
However, the United States cannot just accommodate China. Even though the 
United States cannot contain China from rising, it does not mean that the United 
States will let China rise unchecked. The exclusion of China from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) signaled that liberalism does not work effectively for 
the U.S. foreign policy toward China. On the contrary, this exclusion is a sign of 
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balancing against China. Thus, I argue that the U.S. rebalance to Asia is 
theoretically explained by realism.   
 
However, there are three variants of realism. I will analyze which variant of 
realism offers the best explanation for the U.S. rebalance in Chapter Four. In order 
to analyze the U.S. rebalance in a more critical way, it is important to find out the 
reasons why the United States shifted its foreign policy. Thus, defining the U.S. 
interests in the Asia-Pacific is necessary. All of these issues will be discussed in 
Chapter Three.  
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Chapter Three: the U.S. Interests and Its Relevance to the Rebalance 
 
 
The shift in the U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific through the policy of 
rebalance to Asia is sign that the United States recognizes that the Asia-Pacific 
region has become more important for the United States. According to the ―six 
key lines of actions‖ laid out by the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011, 
p. 58), the rebalance is a policy designed to protect and advance U.S. economic, 
security and diplomatic interests that have long been embedded in the Asia-
Pacific. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the U.S. interests in the Asia-
Pacific and what policies the United States has implemented under the rebalance.  
3.1. Economic Interests  
 
It has been decades since the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945 that 
the Asia-Pacific has maintained its steady and prosperous economic growth. Even 
though the growth rate was sometimes affected by power competitions during the 
Cold War and the financial crises notably in 1997 and 2008, the region has still 
managed to generate growth. In the early 1990s, the Asia-Pacific accounted for 
only 20% of world‘s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (IMF, 2010, p. 6). In 
2000, the region‘s share of world GDP increased to around 30%, and by 2014 
almost 40% (IMF, 2015a, p. 1). With this rapid economic growth, the Asia-Pacific 
accounted for two-third of the global economic growth in 2014.  
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As the region grows, it needs greater attentions from great powers including the 
United States.  The conclusion of the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (FTA) in 
2012 stood out as one of the remarkable developments of the U.S. bilateral FTAs 
with key Asian nations in the early phase of the Obama administration. In addition 
to the U.S.-Singapore and the U.S.-Australia FTA that were signed in 2004 and 
2005 respectively, the U.S.-Korea FTA will give the United States more 
opportunities to expand its economic cooperation with South Korea, one of the 
key security allies in the region.  
 
While Europe is still struggling to recover from its financial crisis, the Asia-
Pacific, which was also affected by the global financial crisis in 2008, managed to 
recover faster and its economies remain stronger than any other region in the 
world. According to the International Monetary Fund (2015b, p. 53), the growth 
rate of the Asia-Pacific in 2014 is 5.6 %, which is the highest rate compared with 
the growth rate of other regions. More importantly, the growth rate of the Asia-
Pacific is positively correlated to that of the United States. By 2013, according to 
Scot Marciel (2013), a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the growth of Asia generated 2.8 
million jobs for the American people as part of the U.S. exports.    
 
As indicated by the trends, it is pretty clear that the Asia-Pacific will remain the 
engine of growth for more years to come. Based on these trends, the United States 
has promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a high-quality free trade 
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agreement, in which 12 countries are members. They are the United States, Japan, 
Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Peru, and Chile.  Concluded in early 2016, the TPP, if it comes into force, will 
account for 40% of the world‘s total GDP. The TPP, as expected, will then be a 
premier trade system in the 21
st
 century.   
3.2. Security Interests 
 
The rapid economic growth in the Asia-Pacific comes along with the growing 
security challenges that need to be properly managed. Maintaining the balance of 
power and the regional stability, as Robert Ross (2013b, p. 25) argues, is the 
optimal goal of the U.S. grand strategy since the end of the Second World War. 
The regional stability and security in this context are not just to prevent wars and 
other forms of armed conflicts, but also to prevent other states from rising as a 
regional hegemon to challenge the U.S. regional supremacy. To do so, the United 
States has maintained its hub-and-spoke system in the Asia-Pacific by deploying 
its military forces and accessing to bases hosted by its allies, such as Japan and 
South Korea. Such military deployments are strategically important for the United 
States to deter aggressive powers, assure security for the allies and friends, and 
maintain its regional security supremacy.    
 
The U.S. regional security supremacy, however, is being challenged by the rise of 
China for two reasons. First, China‘s economic miracle with the thirty-year of 
uninterrupted double-digit economic growth rate has enabled this country to 
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develop its military rapidly. A rapid, but less transparent defense spending 
growth, however, has caused security concerns over the real purposes of China‘s 
military modernization. In 2013, for example, the defense spending announced by 
the Chinese government was US$ 119.5 billion. The U.S. Department of Defense, 
however, believes that the figure is inaccurate, given a large number of China‘s 
military modernization programs. China‘s real defense spending, according to the 
estimation of the U.S. Department of Defense (2014b, p. 43-44), exceeded US$ 
145 billion. Similarly, in its Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Development Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, the U.S. Department 
of Defense (2015, p. 49), believes that the actual defense spending of China in 
2015 is no less than US$ 165 billion rather than US$ 136 billion, which was 
announced by the Chinese government.  
 
Second, in addition to the lack of transparency, China has become more assertive 
and aggressive in the areas of unsettled maritime disputes in the South and East 
China Seas. China‘s People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), for example, forcibly 
took control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippine in 2012. China has just 
constructed a 3,000-meter long runway on the Fiery Cross Reef and is 
constructing a similar runway on the Subi Reef near the Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea (SCS).  Equally important, the Chinese Navy and Coast Guard 
have increased their patrol missions in the East China Seas (ECS). The Chinese 
Coast Guard, Navy, and Air Force have frequently violated the territorial 
sovereignty of Japan. In 2004, for example, a Chinese Han-class nuclear-powered 
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attack submarine secretly sneaked into the territorial water of Japan (Japan 
Ministry of Defense, 2014, p. 34). It seems that there is no sign that China reduces 
its assertiveness. In 2014 alone, for instance, Japan‘s Air Self-Defense Force 
scrambled its fighter jets for 400 times to intercept the Chinese fighter jets that 
were illegally entering the airspace of Japan (Reynolds, 2015).    
 
In respond to the growing security challenges, the United States under the 
rebalance is committed to strengthening security cooperation with its allies and 
friends in Asia. First, the United States has strengthened its security cooperation 
with Japan through a number of mechanisms. The United States successfully 
encouraged Japan to lift its ban on weapons exports in 2014. This eventually 
paves the ways for Japan to get involved in global arms market, which gives 
Japan not only revenues to invest more in its military research and development 
(R&D), but also a political prestige. More importantly, the United States and 
Japan successfully concluded the new U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines in 2015. 
This will allow Japan to play more roles in regional security by deploying its Self-
Defense Forces in the Pacific and in the contingencies to help the U.S. Navy, 
should the U.S. Navy come under an attack.  
 
Second, as part of the rebalance, the United States and Australia reached an 
agreement on rotational deployments of the U.S. Marines in northern territory of 
Darwin in 2011. While the deployments are in the process, the number of the U.S. 
Marines is planned to reach 2,500 by 2017 (Schubert & Purtill, 2015).  In addition to 
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the Marines deployment, the U.S. Air Force is also granted access to the 
Australian naval base of HMAS Stirling on the Garden Island near the city of 
Perth.  
 
Third, the United States has concluded an agreement with the Philippines, one of 
its two security allies in Southeast Asia, to lease a naval base in the Subic Bay 
under the 10-year lease agreement. In addition to paying annual leasing fee, the 
United States has put more efforts to help the Philippines improve its military 
forces by increasing military assistance. From 2002 to 2015, the United States 
provided the Philippines US$ 500 million in military budget (Mogato, 2015). This 
is not to include other types of military equipment, such as patrol boats, and 
training offered by the U.S. Department of Defense.  
 
It seems that the United States not only rebalances to Asia, but also rebalances 
within Asia. As listed in the ―six key lines of actions‖ in her article published by 
Foreign Policy in 2011, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined that 
the U.S. Asia strategy is designed to strengthen cooperation not just only with the 
traditional U.S. allies, but also with other emerging powers in Asia. It is 
noticeable that there has been a proliferation of the agreements of the strategic 
partnership after the rebalance was announced in 2011. Some states in South and 
Southeast Asia have already become strategic partners of the United States. The 
U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed in 2010 followed 
by the conclusion of the U.S.-Singapore Strategic Partnership Dialogue in 2012. 
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Interestingly, Vietnam, a former arch foe of the United States during the Vietnam 
War, finally concluded the agreement with the United States to establish the U.S.-
Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership in 2013. And lately, the U.S.-Malaysia 
Comprehensive Partnership was also concluded in 2014.  
 
The strategic partnership is another strategy of the United States to deepen 
bilateral diplomatic engagements of the United States with the emerging Asian 
powers. It is noticeable that three of the U.S. strategic partners (Singapore, 
Malaysia and Vietnam) are members of the TPP. Based on this diplomatic 
framework, the United States can promote not only economic cooperation, but 
also closer security cooperation. As part of the strategic partnership, for example, 
the United States has been granted accesses to the Changi naval base of Singapore 
where the U.S. Navy has for the first time rotationally deployed two of its Littoral 
Combat Ships (LCSs), USS Freedom and USS Fort Worth since 2013. Two more 
LCSs are planned to deploy in Singapore by 2018. In addition to the rotational 
deployment of LCSs, the United States has permanently deployed in Singapore a 
number of its P-8 Poseidons, the modern spy planes for long-range maritime 
patrol (BBC, 2015).  
 
Furthermore, the U.S. Navy has been granted accesses to ports in Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia for logistic supplies and maintenance. The naval bases of 
Vietnam, particularly the one in Cam Ranh Bay, which used to be the base of the 
Soviet Navy during the Cold War, are strategically important for power projection 
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of the U.S. Navy. Daniel Russel, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, was reported to have openly stated that the strategic 
value of Cam Ranh Bay is one of the key driving forces to deepen diplomatic 
relations between the United States and Vietnam (Simon, 2015, p. 589).  
 
Unlike Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia, the U.S.-India Strategic 
Partnership was cultivated since the second term of the Bush administration in 
2005. The U.S.-India close relations were kicked off after the terror attacks on the 
United States in 2001. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requires the United 
States to expand security cooperation with countries around the world. The U.S.-
India high profile security cooperation took place in 2002 for the first time since 
the end of the Cold War, when the Indian Navy as part of its escort mission 
assisted the U.S. carrier strike groups to navigate from the Indian Ocean to the 
Persian Gulf during the Operation Enduring Freedom (Mohan, 2012, p. 8).  
 
In 2004, the Indian Navy joined the U.S. 7
th
 Fleet to carry out humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operation when India and some other 
Asian countries were hit by the deadly Tsunami in 2004. The Indian Navy, for the 
first time, joined a multilateral military exercise with the United States, Australia 
and Singapore in 2007. The military exercise was conducted on a large scale with 
the participation of three aircraft carriers and hundreds of warships.  At the end of 
the Bush administration, the U.S.-India strategic partnership got a new momentum 
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after the long awaited U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement was finally signed in late 
2008 (Ramamurthy, 2016, p. 141). 
 
Strong U.S.-India strategic partnership has become a fundamental basis for the 
U.S. rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration. President Obama in 2012 
called India to act and engage East (Mudi, 2012, p. 5-6).  The U.S. Secretary of 
States Hillary Clinton (2011, p. 60) claims that ―the United States is making a 
strategic bet on India‘s future that India‘s greater role on the world stage will 
enhance peace and security.‖ As a result of closer military cooperation, India in 
2012 was invited for the first to join the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), a large-
scale military exercise conducted annually in the Pacific Ocean. Not long after 
that, the Indian Navy in 2014 was also invited to for the first time to join the 
Operation Malabar, another large-scale naval exercise conducted annually in the 
Indian Ocean since 1992. 
3.3. Diplomatic Interests  
 
Traditionally, key political leaders of new U.S. administration usually pay their 
first official visits to Europe. Such kind of the tradition was broken by both 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama when the two paid their 
first official visits to Asia in 2009 and 2010 respectively. However, the shift in the 
U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific should not be highlighted only by the first 
trips to Asia by Secretary Clinton and President Obama, but also frequencies of 
their visits and the growing of U.S. engagements with regional institutions. 
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President Obama, for example, visited Asia at least five times during his first 
term, while Secretary Clinton visited Asia for no less than 14 times within her 
first three years in office. The frequencies of visits by Secretary Clinton made her 
become the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit all ASEAN member states 
(Saunders, 2013, p. 5). Similarly, Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, who served as 
the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 2006 to 2011 and from 2011 to 2013 
respectively, paid their official visits to Asia for at least 13 times before they left 
their office.   
 
In addition to the frequency of official visits, there have been growing U.S. 
engagements with regional institutions. The United States is the first non-ASEAN 
member state to appoint its Ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat in 2008. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton resumed U.S. participation in the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) in 2010 after the former Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice skipped it twice on the ground that ARF is less important for security 
dialogue (Emmers, 2015, p. 147). Moreover, the growing regional engagements 
allowed the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to attend the first ASEAN 
Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in 2010. The United States 
finally acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2010 paving the 
way for President Obama to attend the ASEAN-hosted East Asia Summit (EAS) 
for the first time in 2011. 
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The U.S. engagements with regional institutions are very important for the U.S. 
credibility and regional security assurance amid the growing assertiveness of 
China over the maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. The ADMM 
Plus, for instance, technically concentrates on non-traditional security issues, such 
as terrorism, piracy, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). This 
forum, however, serves some strategic and political interests. First, it touches on 
non-traditional security issues, which are not sensitive in terms of state‘s 
sovereignty. Second, by discussing non-sensitive issues, the forum creates a good 
environment for confidence building measures (CMBs), in which CBMs can be 
used as a springboard for the forum to move one step further to discuss other 
sensitive issues, such as code of conduct for maritime security and conflict 
settlements. The U.S. presence at the EAS, ADMM Plus, and ARF is 
diplomatically important for its allies and friends as these engagements are signs 
that the United States is paying greater attentions to this region where China is 
rising as a trouble maker.  
 
In short, the growing U.S. interests and challenges in the Asia-Pacific have 
convinced the United States to pay more attention to this region. With the highest 
growth rate, the Asia-Pacific will remain the fast growing economy for more 
years to come. The rise of China, however, will also remain the challenge of the 
U.S. regional supremacy.  The shift of the U.S. foreign policy through the 
rebalance, however, does not only aim to protect and advance the U.S. interests, 
but also reassure the U.S. allies and friends amid the amid the rise of China‘s 
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assertiveness. The conclusion of new U.S.-Japan Security Guideline in 2015, the 
agreements of strategic partnerships between the United States and Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and the growing U.S. engagements with regional 
institutions are the key U.S. policies implemented after the announcement of the 
U.S. rebalance in 2011. 
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Chapter Four: The U.S. Rebalance in Neoclassical Realism 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the U.S. rebalance to Asia is theoretically explained 
by realism. However, since realism has different variants, and each variant offers 
a different theoretical explanation, it is unclear which variant can best explain the 
U.S. rebalance to Asia. Equally important, there have been discussions about the 
changes of the U.S. military structure after the rebalance was announced. For 
example, the rebalance of the U.S. naval assets –from the current ratio of 50/50 
between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans to 60/40 by 2020 –has been widely 
discussed as part of the U.S. rebalance to Asia (IISS, 2012). Does the rebalance 
change the U.S. military structure in the Asia-Pacific? In other words, are changes 
of the U.S. military posture in the Asia-Pacific driven by the policy of rebalance? 
Therefore, the purposes of this chapter are to discuss three important issues. First, 
I argue the U.S. rebalance is best explained by neoclassical realism. Second, 
because neoclassical realism is closely relevant to domestic politics, I argue that 
in addition to the perceptions of the U.S. political leaders over the changes in the 
international structure, the U.S. rebalance to Asia is partly driven by bureaucratic 
politics. Third, I argue that the rebalance does not change the U.S. military 
strategy in the Asia-Pacific because the United States had changed its military 
posture in the Asia-Pacific years before the rebalance was announced.   
4.1. The Rebalance in Classical Realism 
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Balancing politically and cooperating economically, the U.S.-China relations are 
technically not a zero-sum game. In contrast, both the United States and China 
have long been locked in economic interdependence. In 1979, the total volume of 
trade between the United States and China was merely US$ 2 billion. By 2014, 
the total trade volume between the two countries has reached US$ 591 billion 
(Morrison, 2015a, p. 2). China is now the second-largest trading partner and the 
third largest export market of the United States. With the growing economic 
cooperation, China has become the largest foreign reserve holder of the U.S. 
Treasury bond. By September 2015, China holds US$ 1.26 trillion of the U.S. 
Treasury bond in both private and public sectors (Morrison, 2015a, p. 14).  
 
Besides economic interests, the United States and China also share a number of 
common security interests, such as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), terrorism, piracy, drug smugglings, human trafficking, 
climate change to name a few. One clear example is the North Korean nuclear 
program. As Thomas Christensen (2011, p. 5-7) points out, there are at least three 
reasons why China does not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons. First, if 
North Korea has nuclear weapons, it is highly likely that Japan and Korea will 
follow. Second, if North Korea is armed with nuclear weapons, it will likely seek 
greater political independence from China. Finally, preventing North Korea from 
developing its nuclear weapons will not only maintain the status quo in the 
Korean peninsula but also earn China diplomatic credits to sell its so-called 
peaceful rise in the international system. It is clear that neither the United States 
nor China benefits from the North Korean nuclear program. In contrast, both of 
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them will certainly get benefits if they can cooperate to terminate the nuclear 
program.   
Moreover, the United States and China also share maritime security interests in 
common. To maintain the security of sea lines of communication (SLOC), for 
instance, China joined with other countries to conduct the anti-piracy operation in 
the Gulf of Aden in 2009. The operation marked the first time that China‘s 
People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was deployed far away from their home 
water. While some naval experts argue that the participation of China‘s PLAN 
took place as part of China‘s strategy to increase its navy‘s blue-water 
capabilities, the participation of PLAN contributed to the interests of maritime 
security that all nations share in common (Erickson & Stranger, 2015, p. 75). The 
operation in the Gulf of Aden, as a naval analyst Jeffrey Becker (2016, p. 84) 
observes, served as the fundamental basis for China‘s PLAN to engage in 
international naval diplomacy. As a result, the U.S. Navy and China‘s PLAN 
conducted their naval exercise in that region in 2013. The close military 
cooperation, according to Becker, paved the way for China‘s PLAN to join Rim 
of the Pacific military exercise (RIMPAC) for the first time in 2014.  
Even though the United States and China are locked in strategic mistrust, the 
ongoing economic and security cooperation that the two countries have are the 
clear evidence that the U.S.-China relations are not a zero-sum game. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, by focusing on the absolute gain, classical realism sees 
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state‘s relation as a zero-sum game. Classical realism, therefore, has some 
shortcomings in explaining the U.S. foreign policy toward China.    
4.2. The Rebalance in Neorealism 
 
 
As the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the world has become safe in terms of 
the threats of communism and nuclear attacks of the Soviet Union. However, the 
concerns of international security, particularly the security in the Asia-Pacific, do 
not demise along with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, according to 
Friedberg (1993-94, p. 27-28), is a sign of a polarity change from bipolar to 
multipolar system, in which none of winners or losers has been identified yet.  
 
The rise of China, for example, comes to exist along with the growing economic 
cooperation and security tensions over the maritime territorial disputes. This 
complicated and unclear situation could hardly allow us to define whether we are 
really living in a real peacetime. Such kind of situation, according to Japan 
Defense White Paper 2014 (2014, p. 2), is technically called the ―grey zone.‖ The 
growing assertiveness of China in the region has posed security challenges to the 
U.S. regional supremacy in the eyes of its allies and friends.  
 
The shift in the U.S. foreign policy emphasis on Asia, however, is not solely 
driven by the changes in the international system, and the rise of China, but also 
by the perceptions of the U.S. political leaders over those changes, and the notion 
that the United States is in decline, and the American century is over. The wars in 
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Iraq and Afghanistan, as former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2015, p. 
1) calls the ―eternal drama for America,‖ claimed thousands of lives of the 
American soldiers. The United States spent billions of dollars fighting those 
endless wars for more than a decade. Furthermore, an unexpected financial crisis 
erupted in 2008 made the situation worse. The United States and its people are 
exhausted.  
 
On the other hand, China is rising economically, militarily and diplomatically. 
Some Chinese officials and academics are even proud of their economic rise and 
see the 2008 financial crisis as a sign of the decline of the United States and a 
power shift from the West to the East (Yang & Zhao, 2014, p. 65). Additionally, 
in an interview with Jonathan Tepperman, a managing editor of Foreign Affairs, 
Cui Tiankai, who was appointed as a Chinese Ambassador to the United States in 
2013, clearly said that America is becoming insecure, and its international roles 
are stagnating, if not in decline, while others (including China) are catching up 
(Tepperman, 2013, p. 17).  
 
The concerns of the perceptions of the U.S. decline and its diminishing credibility 
matter to the U.S. political leaders. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for 
example, in her famous article America’s Pacific Century, argues:  
 
In Asia, they ask whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely 
to be distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make and keep 
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credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back 
those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.  
(Clinton, 2011, p. 57)  
 
In a statement of regional architecture in Asia delivered at the University of 
Hawaii, Secretary Clinton (2010) affirmed the position of the U.S. foreign policy 
that ―the United States is back in Asia. But I want to underscore that we are back 
to stay.‖ Similarly, Leon Panetta then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, during the 
Shangri-La Dialogues in Singapore in 2012, clarified the U.S. Asia strategy by 
saying that ―the United States has long been deeply involved in the Asia-Pacific. 
We were there then, we are here now, and we will be here for the future‖ (IISS, 
2012). More importantly, in his 2016 State of Union Address, President Obama 
emphasized on the U.S. supremacy and credibility saying:  
 
All the talk of America‘s economic decline is political hot air. So is all the 
rhetoric you hear about our enemies getting stronger and America getting 
weaker. The United States of America is the most powerful nation on 
earth. Period. It‘s not even close. (in the Final State of Union 2016).  
 
The geopolitical purposes of the rebalance are not only to reassure Asia amid the 
growing assertiveness of China, but also to project a firm American leadership to 
show that the two protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic crisis 
did not weaken the American regional supremacy (Sutter, 2014, p. 100).  Thus, 
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the rebalance silences the notion that America is in decline and washes away any 
misperception and miscalculation about the shrinking of the U.S. leadership in the 
Asia-Pacific.  
 
In short, the U.S. rebalance to Asia is not driven solely by the changes of 
geopolitics and the rise of China in the international politics. But the shift in the 
U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration is also driven by the 
perceptions of the U.S. political leaders. If so, it seems that neorealism also has its 
shortcomings to explain the U.S. rebalance. As discussed in Chapter Two, the key 
assumption of neorealism is that state‘s foreign policy is driven by the changes of 
structure in the international system. Since the rebalance is driven by both the 
structural changes in the international system and domestic politics, neorealism 
cannot offer the best explanation for the U.S. rebalance to Asia.    
4.3. The Rebalance in Neoclassical Realism   
 
It is clear that neither classical realism nor neorealism offers the most precise 
theoretical explanation for the rebalance. However, it is important to emphasize 
that both are relevant to the U.S. rebalance to Asia. Classical realism, for example, 
touches upon the perception of the U.S. political leaders, given the notion of the 
U.S. decline, while neorealism discusses the structural changes in terms of rising 
China. Thus, it would be fair to give both variants some credits, given their 
concepts of balance of power.  
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However, analyzing a state‘s foreign policy based only on the concentration on 
either the unit-level variables or the systemic factors alone, according to 
neoclassical realism, is insufficient. A good analysis of state‘s foreign policy, as 
one of neoclassical realists argues, should focus not only on the structural 
changes, but also how those changes are perceived by states‘ political leaders 
because states cannot design and implement foreign policy own their own, but 
their governments do (Zakaria, 1998, p. 187).  
 
As discussed above, the rebalance is driven by both the structural changes in the 
international politics and the perceptions of the U.S. political leaders. Based on 
these, it seems that the rebalance is better explained by neoclassical realism. If so, 
the questions arise: why and how can neoclassical realism best explain the 
rebalance? In order to answer these questions, I will look at a number of the U.S. 
actual policies to Asia after the announcement of the rebalance. Even though the 
United States is committed to strengthening cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, some 
of these policies are implemented selectively excluding China. Based on these 
selective engagements, I will demonstrate how the discrimination of the U.S. 
policy to exclude China helps the United States maintain its relative power and 
how these policies support neoclassical realism.  
4.3.1. The TPP: From Economic Interests to Economic Leadership  
 
Two of the ―six key lines of actions‖ of the U.S. rebalance focus on the expansion 
of trade and investment, and the cooperation with emerging powers in Asia 
including China (Clinton 2011, p. 58). The actual Asia policy of the United States, 
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however, is currently implemented discriminately against China. One clear 
example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Although the United States has 
emphasized the trend of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific, the TPP was finally 
concluded without China. Technically, the exclusion of China is largely due to the 
Chinese domestic economic structure. The political reasons behind the scene, 
however, remain.  
 
First, having no access to the TPP is equal to preventing China from benefiting 
from the new framework of economic cooperation. The TPP, according to Nina 
Silove (2016, p. 47), a senior researcher at the Center for International Security 
and Cooperation at Stanford University, is the U.S. ―economic denial strategy‖ to 
China.  The absence of China would give the United States a great advantage to 
increase its relative power to dominate the region. Established by 12 nation states 
with their leading economies, the TPP roughly accounts for 40% of world‘s total 
GDP. This new economic block will create a new trading system representing the 
model of a high-quality free trade agreement in the Asia-Pacific.  
 
Furthermore, although the United States has repeatedly claimed that China is 
welcome to join the TPP, the possibility that China manages to join is far from 
clear in the foreseeable future, given China‘s economic structure. One of the most 
challenging issues is the problem of China‘s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By 
the time the United States announced its Rebalance to Asia, the number of the key 
Chinese SOEs has reached 144,700 already (Morrison, 2015b, p. 31). This is not 
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to include other state-owned financial institutions. By 2011, according to 
Morrison (2015b, p. 32), China‘s banking system has largely been controlled by 
the government. For example, four out of the five biggest banks have already been 
under 100% control of the Chinese government.  
 
The Chinese SOEs are root causes of unfair competitions that are strongly 
objected by the TPP‘s principles. With the intervention from the government, the 
Chinese SOEs can produce and sell their products at a much lower price, so that 
other foreign companies cannot compete with. For example, the Chinese SOEs 
have offered special discounted prices of arms sales to the Ministry of Defense, 
reducing the real cost of military hardware for the PLA (Bernstiein & Munro, 
2003, p. 7). While there might be a strategic reason for the Chinese government to 
hide its actual defense budget, it is clear that the Chinese government intervenes 
in businesses. If China can do it now, there is no reason to believe that China will 
not do it after it is admitted to the TPP.  
 
Second, it seems that the United States might have anticipated that China, in the 
short to medium term, cannot totally reform its economic structure to fulfill the 
requirements to become a member of the TPP. It is clear that the majority of the 
big firms of China is SOEs. The large number of SOEs is the clear evidence that it 
is very difficult for China to reform its economic structure. According to Morrison 
(2015b, p. 32), many of the Chinese SOEs have received preferential credits from 
the state-owned banks, such as low-interest rates, long-term loans, and large 
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amount of credit lines.  Thus, the Chinese SOEs depend mainly on the 
government financial supports to drive economic growth. Then, once China 
decides to reform by putting more restrictions on the banking system, China will 
risk closing the majority of its SOEs because they will fail to meet the bank 
requirements to apply for loans. China will, of course, lose its competitiveness in 
the international markets, and the Chinese economy will be severely affected.  
 
In addition, the United States believes that China will do more harm than good if 
China is admitted to the TPP. According to David Loevinger, a Senior 
Coordinator for China Affairs at the U.S. Department of Treasury, China was not 
included in the TPP because the United States knows that not only is China unable  
to comply with requirements of high-quality trade liberalization, China will in 
turn slow down the negotiation process of the TPP (Silove, 2016, p. 84).  Based 
on these, it seems that the United States might have anticipated that China would 
not reform, and that gives the United States a legitimate reason to deny China.  
 
One last important issue is the protections of intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
China is not committed to taking any serious legal action to protect IPRs. Thus, 
the problems of IPRs have become one of the most critical challenges in running 
businesses in China. Pirating has become the culture in China‘s society, and this is 
highly unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.  
 
Instead of taking legal actions to protect IPRs, the Chinese government, in some 
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cases, exercises its political influence to force foreign firms operating in China 
including some of the U.S. firms to share their technologies with the Chinese 
domestic firms (Morrison, 2015b, p. 36). This is in addition to other forms of 
cyber-related theft, in which the Chinese government has been accused by the 
United States of playing roles in supporting such kind of crimes behind the scene. 
The U.S. Department of Justice, for instance, issued a 31-account indictment 
against five PLA officers for their roles in cyber-related theft in May 2014, while 
President Obama issued Executive Order 13964 to sanction a number of Chinese 
firms just days before the official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to the 
United States in April 2015 (Morrison, 2015b, p. 41-42).  
 
The IPRs are very vital for the U.S. economy because the U.S. economy depends 
mainly on technology innovations. The intellectual property-related industries (IP 
industries) have generated more revenues than the non-IP industries. In 2010, 
when the United States was struggling to recover slowly from its financial crisis 
in 2010, the IP industries generated 27.1 million jobs, and the IP industries 
accounted for US$ 5.06 trillion in value added to the U.S. economy, according to 
the observation by Akhtar and Fergusson (2014, p. 6).  This huge amount of 
revenues represented more than two-third of the total GDP of the United States in 
that year.   
 
Since the majority of big firms in China are SOEs, and many of them have long 
violated IPRs to increase their competitive advantages, complying with the 
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principles of IPRs as part of the requirements of the TPP is not going to happen 
soon. If China decides to reform, China‘s economy will become critically risky 
because the real implementations of IPRs will certainly kill many of the Chinese 
SOEs, and a social crisis will emerge if China cannot generate growth. If China 
decides not to reform instead, it cannot join the TPP. The new trading system, if it 
comes into force, will then remain under the leadership of the United States. The 
U.S. leaders are aware that its conditions for China‘s participation are 
prohibitively demanding. As President Obama (Obama says TPP, 2015) was 
quoted as saying ―if we don‘t write the rules for trades around the world, guess 
what? China will!‖ The TPP, of course, the U.S. strategy to balance against China 
in what Ashley J. Tellis (2013, p. 111), a senior associate at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, describes as taking ―advantages in relative 
power, but without incorporating those components that would spell 
containment.‖  
4.3.2. The Security Allies and Strategic Partners: Narrowing the Gaps 
in Relative Power 
 
Although the United States and China are benefiting from their complex 
economic interdependence, it does not mean both countries are equally satisfied 
by the gains. As Kevin Cooney (2009, p. 49) argues, China might be satisfied by 
the growing American dependence on its cheap products, while it keeps building 
its military. If this situation continues, as Tellis (2013, p. 110) observes, ―the U.S. 
benefits from its ties to China in absolute terms, but loses in relative terms.‖ The 
growth generated by the economic cooperation will allow China to continue its 
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military modernization, which will finally threaten the United States and its allies 
and friends in the Asia-Pacific.  
 
Such kind of situation has put the United States in a difficult position, in which 
the Cold War-style containment is clearly not an option. The United States, 
however, can never let China continue rising unchecked. While the United States 
cannot contain China, it does not mean that the United States cannot balance 
against China. But any form of balancing against China should not be conducted 
in a direct way, but in an indirect way to avoid unnecessary hostility to China 
(Tellis, 2013, p.111, Silove, 2016, p. 47). The United States needs to strengthen 
its security cooperation with its allies and strategic partners, while trying to avoid 
unnecessary direct confrontations with China.  
 
The change of the U.S. position to support Japan in the island disputes in the East 
China Sea is an example that a direct confrontation is counterproductive for the 
policy of the rebalance. According to Carlyle A. Thayer (2012), the United States 
was in the dilemma after Japan decided to nationalize the Senkaku islands for two 
reasons. First, the U.S. alliance credibility would be affected if the United States 
ignored not to support Japan‘s action. Second, if the United States took the 
position in favor of Japan, as obligated by the spirit of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the 
United States would have to encounter a higher diplomatic tension with China, 
and which is inconsistent with the political goals of the rebalance.  
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In fact, the United States explicitly opposed the plan of the Japanese government 
since the beginning. However, the Japanese government ignored the U.S. 
warning. As former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell (U.S. warned 
government, 2013) recalls, ―even though we warned Japan, Japan decided to go in 
a different direction, and they thought they had gained the support of China, or 
some did, which we were certain that they had not.‖ 
 
Japan, which paid a very close attention to the incident of the Scarborough Shoal 
in the South China Sea in the early 2012, does not want to see such kind of an 
incident happening in the East China Sea. The shift in the U.S. foreign policy to 
Asia through the policy of the rebalance gave Japan an opportunity to exploit this 
policy and test the commitment of the United States to its alliance obligations 
(Thayer, 2012). Although President Obama in 2014 publicly stated that the U.S.-
Japan alliance covers the Senkaku islands, it is clear that by 2012, the United 
States was still taking neutral positon, and suggested that Japan and China solve 
the problem diplomatically. The issue of the Senkaku islands clearly shows that 
Japan and the United States have the different views of the U.S. rebalance. The 
United States wants to increase its influence in the Asia-Pacific, while avoiding 
provoking China. The Senkaku issue, however, forced the United States to take 
side and risk encountering a tougher diplomatic tension with China.   
 
Another best way that the United States can balance against China without 
necessarily confronting China directly is to bring a third party into the equation. 
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Robert Jervis (1978, p. 175) examined the case of the changes in British and 
French foreign policies to respond to threats from Germany during the Second 
World War. France and Britain believed that if both of them increased their 
military power and cooperate with each other, they could more effectively reduce 
threats from Germany than if they worked individually. Jervis (1978, p. 175) 
contended ―when a state believes that another not only is not likely to be an 
adversary, but has sufficient interests in common with it to be an ally, then it will 
actually welcome an increase in the other‘s power.‖  
 
In other words, if we bring the like-minded states up, although they are currently 
not our allies, those states will help us to narrow the gap in relative power that is 
currently not in our favor. This can be applied to the proliferation of the U.S. 
strategic partners in Asia under the Obama administration. Tellis explains the 
logic of the strategy to strengthen the strategic partnership:  
 
If the consequential states abutting China—such as Japan, India, Vietnam, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia, among others—can be aided by U.S. 
power to realize their strategic potential and to increase their mutual 
cooperation while deepening their partnership with the United States, the 
net effect would be to create objective constraints that limit the misuse of 
Chinese power in Asia (Tellis, 2013, p. 112).  
 
This is a win-win strategy for both the United States and its allies and partners 
75 
 
because they are given ―an opportunity to limit Beijing‘s capacity for malevolence 
without sacrificing the common prosperity arising from trade and 
interdependence‖ (Tellis, 2013, p. 113).  
 
The rise of the U.S. allies and strategic partners will, to some extent, cost the 
United States its monopoly of power. Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and others will have to occupy a greater space of 
international politics. Their strong economies will have to compete with the 
United States and other countries including China. But, these states are U.S. allies 
and strategic partners, who share common interests with the United States. The 
rise of these states, therefore, will help the United States balance against China in 
an indirect and effective way without necessarily confronting China directly.  
According to neoclassical realism, a state is willing to accept a smaller share of 
gains in absolute terms, if by doing so it can narrow the gap in relative gains 
favoring its partner (Grieco, 1990, p. 44-45; Mastanduno, 1991, p. 79). If so, the 
policy of the rebalance to bring Asians up will certainly help the United States 
narrow the gap in relative gains that is currently in favor of China.  
 
Equally important, cooperation in trilateral frameworks have been growing after 
the announcement of the rebalance in 2011. In addition to focusing on bilateral 
security cooperation, the United States has strategically created trilateral security 
cooperation frameworks with allies and strategic partners. For example, Indonesia 
was invited to a joint Australia-U.S.-Indonesia trilateral military exercise in 2012.  
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The United States, Japan, and Australia conducted their trilateral naval exercise 
2014. In 2015, the United States, Japan, and India held their trilateral security 
dialogue for the first time, and the three countries conducted a trilateral naval 
exercise in March 2016. Such kind of trilateral security cooperation was rare 
before 2011.  With this trend, the strengthening of the security alliance, and 
strategic partnerships can lead to de-facto trilateral security alliances in the Asia-
Pacific in the future. The trilateral security alliances would be of great interests for 
the United States to boost its relative power to dominate the region.  
 
As a Polish-American political scientist and geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski 
(2012, p. 181) wrote in his recent book Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis 
of Global Power, the United States has involved in the multilateral dimensions of 
cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Five of its security alliances are in the Pacific. 
The United States has clearly expressed its political will to support India as a 
candidate for the membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
The United States has engaged with regional institutions, such as ASEAN, 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS) to name a few. 
Maintaining this momentum, according to Brzezinski, is the best strategy of 
choice for America to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.  
 
Engaging with strategic partners in Asia has put the United States on the right 
track for the regional balance of power. As Fareed Zakaria (2008, p. 241-242) 
argues, the American grand strategy should not follow the British model of 
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balancing against the rising power as it did to Germany during the inter-war 
period, because it is deadly dangerous. In contrast, the United States should 
follow the Bismarckian approach of Germany by engaging all rising powers to 
have better relations than they have among themselves. By doing this, the United 
States is in a good position to maintain its relative power and continue dominating 
the region for more years to come. Although military power is an important tool 
of state‘s foreign policy, the United States should ―think asymmetrically‖ that 
military is not always the best choice to achieve foreign policy goals (Zakaria, 
2008, p. 244). Strengthening the strategic partnerships would allow the United 
States to increase its relative power without using force, which is risky.  
 
William T. Tow (2015, p. 47) moderately argues that the rebalance should not be 
interpreted as a synonym of a pure balance-of-power strategy.  It is about how the 
U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and its power would maintain regional peace 
and security. This is a win-win policy, from which everyone including China can 
benefit. As one of neoclassical realist has recently claimed that even though China 
is excluded from the TPP, door remains open for China to join the TPP whenever 
it can meet the requirements (which is not expected to happen in the short and 
medium term) (Rose, 2015, p. 10). That means the United States is still applying 
engagement approach toward China amid the latter‘s growing assertiveness and 
the resulting diplomatic tensions.  
4.4. Rebalance in Bureaucratic Politics  
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Another reason to drive the shift in the U.S. foreign policy under the Obama 
administration is bureaucratic politics. As Jeffery Taliaferro (2006, p. 40) argues 
―foreign policy is made by flesh-and-blood officials.‖ State‘s foreign policy, 
therefore, is partly influenced by a group of key officials involving in decision-
making process. General George Marshall, for example, rejected any plan 
proposed by the U.S. Department of States to use development aid as an incentive 
to encourage China to reform its policy, but he supported the same idea only after 
he was nominated as the U.S. Secretary of States (Jervis, 1976, p. 26).   
 
A similar bureaucratic politics is applied to the shift in the U.S. foreign policy to 
the Asia-Pacific. Soon after Hillary Clinton was nominated as the U.S. Secretary 
of States, she recruited her own team for the Asia-Pacific affairs. Some of her key 
officials are former officials who were in charge of the Asia-Pacific affairs during 
the Clinton administration. For example, Jim Steinberg, an expert of the Asia- 
Pacific, who used to serve as the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor during 
the Clinton administration, was nominated as the U.S. Deputy Secretary of States.  
Kurt Campbell, a former senior official at the Pentagon and National Security 
Council for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, was nominated as the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State. Similarly, Tom Donilon, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs, was nominated as the U.S. National Security Advisor. 
These key officials played a key role in designing the U.S. Asia strategy.  
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As Robert Jervis (1976, p. 25) argues ―where you stand is determined by where 
you sit.‖ Similarly, Magaret Hermann and Charles Hermann (1989, p. 362) point 
out that ―although we recognize that the numerous domestic and international 
factors can and do influence foreign policy behavior, these influence must be 
channeled through the political structure of a government that identifies, decides, 
and implements foreign policy.‖ The background and expertise of a team recruited 
by the U.S. Secretary Hillary Clinton during the first term of President Obama 
indicate that they are architectures of the U.S. rebalance to Asia. The policy is, 
therefore, partly influenced by bureaucratic politics.  
4.5. Is the U.S. military structure in the Asia-Pacific changed by the U.S. 
Rebalance?  
 
There have been some remarkable changes in the U.S. military forces in the Asia-
Pacific after the announcement of the rebalance in 2011. As briefly discussed in 
Chapter Three, the deployment of the U.S. Marines to Darwin, Australia, the 
access of the U.S. Air Forces to the HMAS Stirling Naval Base on Garden Island 
near the city of Perth in Australia, the deployment of Littoral Combat Ships 
(LCSs) and P-8 reconnaissance planes to Singapore, and the access of the U.S. 
Navy to naval bases in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia as part of its rotational 
deployment are highlighted as significant changes in the U.S. military posture in 
the Asia-Pacific. These changes are technically consistent with the announcement 
by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to rebalance the U.S. naval 
assets from the current ratio of 50/50 to 60/40 for the Pacific and the Atlantic 
Ocean respectively (IISS, 2012).  
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However, the shift of the U.S. military posture under the Obama administration, 
according to some researchers, is not really new because the United States had 
restructured its military posture in the Asia-Pacific years before President Obama 
announced the rebalance in 2011. Robert Ross (2012, p. 76; 2013a, p. 2), for 
example, observed that in 1997 the U.S. Navy, for the first time since the end of 
the Cold War, moved a few of its submarines from Europe to stand by in Guam. 
In fact, the rebalance of the U.S. naval assets was actually initiated years before 
Panetta‘s announcement at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2012. According to the 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Department of Defense, 2001, p. 27), 
a report of the U.S. military strategy released in every four years by the U.S. 
Department of Defense, the United States clearly stated ―the Secretary of the 
Navy will increase aircraft carrier battle group presence in the Western Pacific 
and will explore options for homeporting an additional three to four surface 
combatants, and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), in that area.‖ Clearly, 
the United States not only started rebalancing its naval assets, but also seeking for 
the homeporting option since 2001, and this is exactly the same to the ―rotational 
deployment‖ of the U.S. Navy in Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
today.   
 
Furthermore, the 2001 QDR also discussed U.S. concerns about the security 
situation in the East Asian littoral region. It explicitly stated:  
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Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The 
possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource 
base will emerge in the region. The East Asian littoral –from the Bay of 
Bengal to the Sea of Japan –represents a particularly challenging area 
(Department of Defense, 2001, p. 4).  
 
The development of the Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), which are currently 
operational in Singapore, took place in this context.  
 
The shift of the U.S. naval assets to the Pacific Ocean became even more obvious 
when the 2006 QDR explicitly articulated the growing regional challenges that 
require the U.S. PACOM to pay more attention and expand its area of 
responsibility (AOR). The 2006 QDR addressed the future responsibilities of the 
U.S. Pacific fleet:  
 
The fleet will have greater presence in the Pacific Ocean, consistent with 
the global shift of trade and transport. Accordingly, the Navy plans to 
adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally 
available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific 
to support engagement, presence and deterrence. (Department of Defense, 
2006, p. 47)  
 
Based on these trends, the rebalance of the naval assets of the United States is not 
really a new strategy, given its part of the U.S. rebalance to Asia under the 
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administration of President Obama. To some researchers, the rebalance of naval 
assets as stated by Leon Panetta in 2012 is just a rhetorical statement because the 
policies had taken place well before it was announced (Cossa & Glosserman, 
2013, p. 4). The U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter (2013, p. 15) strongly 
defended that the rebalance is not a marketing strategy saying ―we are not just 
talking the talk. We‘re walking the walk.‖ However, the evidence vindicates that 
the changes of the U.S. military posture in the Asia-Pacific had taken place years 
before the rebalance was announced. It is clear that the changes of the U.S. 
military are not driven by the U.S. rebalance.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
 
The U.S. rebalance to Asia announced in 2011 under the Obama administration is 
a remarkable turning point of the U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the 21
st
 
century emphasizing the changes in areas of interests of the United States in 
economic, diplomatic and security issues. For the economic issues, it is clear that 
Asia-Pacific has generated steady growth for decades since the end of the Second 
World War. At the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific accounted for only 20% 
of world‘s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (IMF, 2010, p. 6). However, by 
2014 the Asia-Pacific accounted for roughly 40% of world‘s total GDP (IMF, 
2015a, p. 1). The conclusion of the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement in 2012 and 
the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in late 2015 marked 
outstanding initiatives of economic cooperation, in which the Asia-Pacific is the 
most important sources of the U.S. economic interests. Also, the growing U.S. 
diplomatic engagements with the Asia-Pacific are marked by the growing U.S. 
engagements with regional institutions in Asia.  
 
The U.S. interests are closely connected with regional peace and stability. In the 
Asia-Pacific, the United States has maintained its hub-and-spoke system in the 
Pacific since the end of the Second World War. The U.S. 7
th
 Fleet has 
permanently deployed a carrier strike group in Japan for years. The U.S. regional 
security supremacy, however has been challenged by a number of critical issues, 
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such as the North Korean nuclear program and the rise of China, terrorism, piracy 
to name a few. 
 
However, China, in particular, has caused many security concerns. First, more 
than three decades of steady economic growth has enabled China to modernize its 
military in a massive scale. Second, China‘s military modernization is taking 
place with less transparency. Third, as China‘s military grows stronger, China has 
become more assertive and aggressive when it comes to deal with the unsettled 
maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. As the security tensions are 
on the rise, the United States has been in deep concerns for prospects of regional 
security. The U.S. rebalance, therefore, seeks to maintain regional peace and 
stability by strengthening the U.S. security cooperation with the allies and friends 
in the Asia-Pacific. The conclusion of the new U.S.-Japan security alliance in 
2015, for example, is one of the U.S. strategies to strengthen regional security 
cooperation.  
 
As the U.S. security supremacy is being challenged by the rise of China, the 
rebalance is the U.S. strategy designed to check the rise of China. Thus, the 
rebalance is realism.  But there are different variants of realism that offer different 
theoretical explanations. However, I argue that neither classical realism nor 
neorealism offers a more precise theoretical explanation for the U.S. rebalance to 
Asia than neoclassical realism. The failure of both classical realism and 
neorealism to explain the rebalance can be proved by two reasons.   First, the 
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U.S.-China relations cannot be categorized as a zero-sum game. Even though the 
United States and China are in a political rivalry, the two countries are in an 
economic partnership. The growing trades and economic cooperation have already 
locked the two countries in economic interdependence. Because classical realists 
focus on absolute gains, they tend to see inter-state relations as a zero-sum game. 
Therefore, the U.S. rebalance cannot be explained by classical realism.    
 
Second, the U.S. rebalance cannot be explained by neorealism, because the shift 
in the U.S. foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific is not only driven by the structural 
changes in the international system, but also by the U.S. domestic politics. It is 
true that the United States under the Obama administration shifted its foreign 
policy to the Asia-Pacific where China is rising and provoking regional peace and 
security. However, the rise of China is not enough to explain how the U.S. foreign 
policy is made. The U.S. political leaders have repeatedly affirmed a strong status 
of the United States in international politics. President Obama, for example, has 
recently defended the American supremacy saying:  
 
All the talk of America‘s economic decline is political hot air. So is all the 
rhetoric you hear about our enemies getting stronger and America getting 
weaker. The United States of America is the most powerful nation on 
Earth. Period. It‘s not even close. (in the Final State of Union, 2016). 
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It sounds that the message itself carries an ambiguous statement that the United 
States is in deep concerns about the notion of the U.S. decline. Then, it is quite 
obvious that the U.S. rebalance is not only driven the factor of structural change, 
the rise of China, but also by the perceptions of the U.S. political leaders. Since 
neorealism argues that state‘s foreign policy is driven only by structural changes, 
the U.S. rebalance to Asia cannot be best explained by neorealism.  
5.1. Why Neoclassical Realism?  
 
This thesis concludes that the U.S. rebalance to Asia is best explained by 
neoclassical realism for two reasons. First, according neoclassical realists, 
analyzing states‘ foreign policy by focusing solely on either domestic politics or 
systemic factors is inaccurate. It is undeniable that the changes in the system are 
important to state‘s foreign policy, but it is also equally important to understand 
how those changes are perceived by political leaders.  
 
It is important to reiterate the argument of a prominent neoclassical realist that no 
states make foreign policy on their own, but their governments do (Zakaria, 1998, 
p. 187).  Neoclassical realism analyzes states‘ foreign policy by seeking a middle 
way to link both classical realism and neorealism together. That is the way to 
construct an immediate link between power and state‘s foreign policy. As Brian 
Rathbun (2008, p. 307) concluded, ―neoclassical realism is understood as the use 
of domestic politics to fill out the incomplete picture begun by structural realism.‖ 
In the words of William C. Wohlforth (2012, p. 40), neoclassical realists are not 
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motivated by any incentive to construct a universal theory of international politics, 
but they are interested in looking for the most precise realist school of thought to 
analyze state‘s foreign policy ―at a given place and time.‖  
 
Second, unlike classical realism, which focuses on absolute gains, neoclassical 
realism focuses on relative gains. It is true that neorealism also focuses on relative 
gains when it comes to discuss relative distribution of power (Waltz, 1979, p. 
105).  Neorealism, however, did not discuss how the gaps in relative power, if 
continues in the long run, will change states‘ foreign policy, but neoclassical 
realism does. The reason why states are sensitive to the relative gains, according 
to neoclassical realism, is because states believe that the relative gains favoring 
their partners will increase their partners‘ relative power, from which their 
partners will one day use the relative power to coerce or attack them 
(Mastanduno, 1991, p. 78).   
 
Through the rebalance, the United State can increase its relative power by at least 
two main factors. The first factor is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The 
conclusion of the TPP by twelve member states with their leading economies will 
be a model of a modern free trade agreement in the 21
st
 century. The TPP will 
then represent up to 40% of the world‘s total GDP. The TPP, however, excluded 
China on the ground that China has yet to fulfill the policy requirements to join 
this new economic bloc. The exclusion of China, as discussed in Chapter 4, is 
equal to denying China access to benefiting from the economic cooperation. By 
88 
 
doing this, the United States, as the largest economic power, can slow down the 
rise of China indirectly, and increase its relative power to continue dominating the 
region without necessarily confronting China in a direct way.  
 
The second factor is the strengthening of strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. 
It is important to note that two of the TPP member states (Japan and Australia) are 
U.S. security allies, while three others (Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore) are 
U.S. strategic partners. The close economic cooperation will allow the United 
States to strengthen deeper security cooperation with its allies and strategic 
partners. The U.S. military deployments in Australia and the access of the U.S. 
Navy to naval bases in Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia are the 
outcome of strategic partnerships, and it is strategically important for the power 
projection of the United States in the region.  
 
In addition to regional power projection, bringing these Asian states up is very 
useful for the United States to narrow the gaps in relative gains currently favoring 
China. It is true that if the U.S. allies and strategic partners grow stronger, they 
will certainly occupy a greater place in international politics. Competitions are 
inevitable. The United States, however, is still willing to do this, if doing so can 
narrow the gaps in relative gains of China. As neoclassical realists argue, a state 
does not hesitate to accept less gain in absolute term, if doing so can help that 
state narrow the gaps in relative gains favoring its partners (Grieco, 1990, p. 44-
45; Mastanduno, 1991, p. 79).  
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Based on these reasons, I argue that the shift in the U.S. foreign policy through the 
policy of the U.S. rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration is best 
explained by neoclassical realism. It might not be possible to stop China from 
rising, but it does not mean that it is impossible to slow down the rise of China. 
As Tellis (2013, p. 110) argues we can forget the containment because there will 
be no return of George Kennan in the U.S.-China relations today, but we cannot 
forget balancing. China is rising rapidly. However, the problem is not about who 
is running fast, but who is running faster.  
 
Michael Mastanduno wrote an article published in International Security in 1991 
asking ―do relative gains matter?‖ This thesis would like to answer: Yes, it does, 
and it will. Amitav Acharya in 2008 wrote a book of which title asks ―The Rise of 
Asia: Who is leading?‖ I would like to answer by asking ―under the system 
dominated by who?‖  The strategic goal of the U.S. rebalance is similar to a 
statement, which was delivered by Britain‘s First Lord of the Admiralty in June 
1934:  
 
We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with 
anybody because we have got most of the world already or the best 
parts of it and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent other 
from taking it away from us (cited in Scheweller, 1998, p. 24).  
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In neoclassical realism, the U.S. rebalance is not a strategy seeking to maximize 
the security, but the rebalance is designed to respond to the growing uncertainties 
of external environment by seeking greater influence to shape these uncertainties 
to continue dominating the system. It is likely that China will continue rising for 
more years to come, but China will continue rising only as a follower, while the 
United States will continue staying as a leader. The U.S. foreign policy to the 
Asia-Pacific, as John Ikenberry (2008, p. 33) concluded, ―is based on America‘s 
position as a hegemonic and status quo power in the region. It wants continuity 
more than change, and its security and economic strategies toward the region 
reflect this reality.‖ That is why the U.S. rebalance is best explained by 
neoclassical realism.  
5.2. Gaps in this Research 
 
While the main objective of this thesis is to analyze the U.S. foreign policy to 
China through the policy of the rebalance to Asia, this thesis can only offer a 
partial theoretical explanation. The gaps in the research remain. First, the U.S.-
China relations are dynamic. The changes of the two countries‘ relationship are 
ongoing. This research is written in 2016, which is the last year of the Obama 
administration. It is not clear who is going to be the next President of the United 
States, but it is clear that there must be some changes when the new President 
comes to office. For example, none of the front runners of the U.S. presidential 
candidates has supported the TPP. With this uncertainty about the future of the 
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TPP, the future of the U.S. rebalance is an ongoing question for the future 
researches.  
 
Second, scope and limitation of the thesis do not allow this thesis to offer a 
comprehensive analysis of the U.S. foreign policy to China. The research focuses 
only on the U.S. rebalance to Asia, which is the American foreign policy under 
the Obama administration from 2009 to 2016. Equally important, although the 
thesis concludes that the U.S. rebalance is best explained by the neoclassical 
realism, it does not mean that other theories, such as liberalism, constructivism, 
classical realism or neorealism are irrelevant. For example, in the analytical 
sections, the thesis discusses the individual perceptions of the U.S. political 
leaders, which are relevant to both classical realism and constructivism. However, 
because the research pays attention to the perceptions in terms of variants of 
realism, it did not pay attention to the perceptions of other theories.  Thus, 
research findings can give a partial explanation in the light of neoclassical realism 
only.   
 
Third, as the U.S. interests are closely connected to peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific, the issues of the South and East China Seas remain the critical 
security flashpoints challenging the U.S. interests. China‘s military base 
expansions require the United States to pay more attention to, and to work closely 
with the allies and strategic partners to properly manage the problems.  
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Forth, countries in the Asia-Pacific have been rapidly building their military. 
China, India, ASEAN countries and others have increased the defense budget year 
to year. The defense spending in Asia has surpassed that of Europe since 2012. 
According to Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS, 2015, p. 209), the 
regional defense spending increased from US$ 270 billion in 2010 to US$ 344 
billion in 2014. The security flashpoints in the maritime territorial disputes, and 
the rapid military build-up have made the security issues in the Asia-Pacific even 
more critical. A large-scale armed conflict is possible due to misperception and 
miscalculation. And all of these problems are subject to further researches in the 
future.  
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